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INTRODUCTION

Compulsory licensing has been a lightening rod of
controversy in the global arena. Recent compulsory licenses
issued by Thailand and Brazil expose very different views from
patent-owning pharmaceutical companies versus developing
countries and their sympathizers. For example, while one
headline trumpets “Brazil, Thailand Override Big Pharma
Patents,” another reads “Pharma’s Seven Deadly Lies about Thai
1
Compulsory Licenses.” Patent owners primarily argue that
compulsory licenses will inevitably kill the goose that lays the
1.
Jon Cohen, Brazil, Thailand Override Big Pharma Patents, 316 SCIENCE 816
(2007); Posting of Brook K. Baker, Pharma’s Seven Deadly Lies About Thai Compulsory
Licenses, to IP Disputes in Medicine (Feb. 1, 2007, 11:14 EST), http://www.cptech.org/
blogs/ipdisputesinmedicine/2007/02/pharmas-seven-deadly-lies-about-thai.html.
There
are, of course, also intermediate positions. For example, sometimes an article will refer to
a compulsory license as “breaking” patents, while simultaneously acknowledging that
such an action is “completely legal.” Jonathan Head, Thailand Takes on Drugs Giants,
BBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6587379.stm.
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golden egg, on the assumption that patent profits are required to
fund research and development costs. Patent owners often
minimize discussion of whether such licenses are legal. On the
other hand, developing countries and their sympathizers usually
ignore innovation issues and instead emphasize the literal
language of TRIPS, the international agreement that explicitly
2
permits compulsory licenses.
Many seem inclined to believe that there is a single correct
answer. Public discussions of compulsory licenses not only
include quick dismissals of opposing views, but outright hostility
and name calling. Patent-owning pharmaceutical companies are
3
called greedy corporations that place profits above life, whereas
public health advocates are decried as anti-property activists and
4
patent hooligans. The one commonality between these positions
is that they believe that only one view can be true. However,
considering that there are intelligent people on both sides,
including attorneys that should understand the law, the
polarized positions raise a question of whether there are
alternative phenomena at issue.
The seeming deadlock in views suggests that there is a need
to look for new insight to better understand and get beyond the
deadlock. This Article does just that. This Article suggests that
there are two competing perspectives that each provide a
different lens through which to view whether compulsory licenses
are consistent with TRIPS. Each lens may be consistent within
the previously known categories of the rights-maximalist or
rights-minimalist approach to patent law. However, unlike most
scholarship that advocates a single approach—whether it is to
maximize or minimize rights—this Article suggests that neither
is per se correct. Rather, this Article posits that the more
important phenomenon is how a particular perspective impacts

2.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
3.
At one point, a website critical of the pharmaceutical company Abbott
Laboratories’ actions against Thailand existed at http://www.abbottsgreed.com. Although
the website is no longer live, an archived version is available at http://web.archive.org/
web/20080424010611rn_2/www.abbottsgreed.com.
4.
See, e.g., Editorial, Bangkok’s Drug War Goes Global, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Mar. 7,
2007, at 13; Ronald A. Cass, Op-Ed., Patent Remedy, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Aug. 28, 2007, at
13 (stating that those who endorse compulsory licenses “oppose protection of property
rights in general and IP rights in particular”). In addition, a website critical of
Thailand was created at http://www.thailies.com. Although that website is no longer
active, an archived version is available at http://web.archive.org/web/20070909172311/
http://www.thailies.com.

(3) HO

1050

1/2/2010 6:53:49 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[46:4

how laws are interpreted and understood. Moreover, this Article
seeks to demonstrate that recognizing the existence of these
differing perspectives is critical because each serves as a
powerful prism that impacts how laws, such as TRIPS, are
interpreted and understood. Given that there is widespread
discord not only on the appropriateness of compulsory licenses,
but on the broader question of the appropriate balance between
patents and public health, a better understanding of the impact
of these competing perspectives could have significant
implications for an improved understanding of current
controversies and more viable solutions.
The basic thesis is that there is a spectrum of views on
patents benchmarked by two distinct and seemingly
irreconcilable perspectives. One perspective of patents is that
they are a mere privilege granted by a nation and are inherently
subject to limitations to accommodate other societal goals, such
as access to medicine. This view is referred to as the “privilege
view” of patents. The alternative perspective views patents as a
type of super-property right that should seldom, if ever, be
subject to exception. This Article refers to this perspective as an
“uber-right” view in contrast to the traditional conception of
property rights that necessarily includes limitations and
exceptions. The privilege view of patents can find some roots in
the historical genesis of patents because patents were once a
privilege conveyed by the crown and also often had restrictions
5
on where the patented invention was used. On the other hand,
the patents as a super-property view may reflect a more modern
6
conception by some.
This Article suggests that these differing perspectives are at
least as important as a proper interpretation of international
5.
See Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents
Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 183–86 (2004)
(discussing early patents as a “creature of royal prerogative” because there were no
criteria for patentability, or even scope of patent privilege); Paul Champ & Amir Attaran,
Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the
U.S.–Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 370–73 (2002) (noting that patents
were originally designed not to protect inventors, but to protect domestic interests, such
that early patent laws often required patents to be forfeited if they were not used in the
granting territory); see also CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 53–54 (2006) (discussing early grants of privilege
as they relate to modern day patents). But see Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas
Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical
Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 992, 1012 (2007) (challenging the traditional view that
American patents are special legal privileges).
6.
See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 5 (2003) (suggesting that
increasing use of the term “rights” with respect to intellectual property suggests that they
must be upheld).
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law. After all, the current controversy exists against a backdrop
7
of legal rules that permit compulsory licensing. Some clear rules,
such as what subject matter may be licensed, have been distorted
8
to reflect a desired (uber-right) perspective of patents. In
addition, both perspectives are responsible for injecting a number
of non-issues into the discussion that serve as a smoke screen
that blocks attention to issues in need of true resolution under
9
TRIPS. The extent of the distortions and non-issues suggests
that the controversies must be explained by more fundamental
phenomena than simple rhetoric and issue-framing. Granted,
these tools can be very powerful in shaping the creation and
10
interpretation of law. However, the perspectives outlined here
may reflect fundamental beliefs that precede more conscious
rhetoric and issue-framing.
The competing perspectives may provide an enriched
understanding of the negotiation of TRIPS, as well as subsequent
controversies beyond compulsory licenses. In particular, the
competing perspectives may provide an alternative narrative for
why developing countries agreed to TRIPS. The broad language
under TRIPS may have permitted each side to believe that the
agreement adequately reflected its views. Subsequent
controversies can be viewed as instances where divergent
perspectives are exposed. Thus far, the perspectives have been
lurking below the surface. However, if more explicitly
acknowledged, they could perhaps be more directly addressed in
future conflicts when WTO panels are commissioned to resolve
TRIPS issues.
In addition, a better understanding of competing
perspectives may provide an important foundation for viable
global solutions concerning the intersection of patents and public
health. There have been several instances thus far where
countries have attempted to clarify the intersection of patents
and public health under TRIPS, including when compulsory
licenses are permissible. For example, in 2001 all WTO countries
agreed to the Doha Public Health Declaration, which affirms the
11
ability to provide compulsory licenses. However, the unanimity
behind adoption of the Declaration has dissolved into divergent
perspectives with regard to text that would otherwise seem clear,

7.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31.
8.
See infra Part IV.B.
9.
See infra Part IV.C.
10.
See, e.g., SELL, supra note 6, at 26–29.
11.
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 5,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Public Health Declaration].
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12

as will be later discussed. Similarly, although all countries
agreed that some type of exception to TRIPS was required to
provide access to low-cost drugs for the poorest countries, the
13
solution seems to satisfy no one and also not be effective.
Perhaps if the competing perspectives are better understood,
problems can be anticipated and potentially addressed in the
proposal stage.
While this Article aims primarily to document the
sometimes dramatic impact of each perspective on how laws are
interpreted, the phenomena can also be understood against the
broader context of social cognition research. In particular, there
is rich literature in that field that supports the idea that prior
knowledge and beliefs may substantially impact how new
information is processed. In particular, such literature supports
the fact that existing “schemas,” such as a perspective, would be
resistant to change even in the face of contradictory evidence.
While this Article does not attempt to provide a thorough
discussion of this literature, this Article will briefly address how
the perspectives are consistent with this literature and its
implications. After all, insights from other bodies of knowledge
may help to reframe issues to get beyond blaming and move
towards problem solving.
This Article proceeds in five parts following this
Introduction. Part II provides a brief explanation of the two
patent perspectives that will be explored in further depth
throughout the Article. Part III provides a case study of
competing perspectives concerning several compulsory licenses in
Thailand. Part IV takes a “behind the scenes” look at the
differing perspectives in comparison to the rule of law under
TRIPS. This Part begins by providing and explaining the
relevant TRIPS provision at issue for compulsory licenses. Then,
it documents and explains some dominant misconceptions

12.
See infra Part IV.B–C.
13.
See World Trade Organization, General Council Decision of 30 August 2003,
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 General Council Decision].
However, to date this “solution” has only been utilized once to provide drugs to Rwanda.
See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health
Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the
Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 938 (2007). In addition, the
company that was licensed to provide the drugs has since stated that it would be
reluctant to do so again because of undue complexity. Press Release, Apotex, CAMR
Federal Law Needs to Be Fixed if Life-Saving Drugs for Children Are to Be Developed
(May 14, 2009), http://www.apotex.com/global/about/press/20090514.asp (quoting Jack
Kay, President of Apotex, as stating that “in its current form, [CAMR is] not workable for
us and, it appears, it doesn’t work easily for developing countries”).
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concerning TRIPS, followed by non-issues that are frequently
raised that mask legitimate TRIPS issues in need of
interpretation. Part V first provides alternative explanations to
the perspectives phenomena, but rebuts each one. In addition,
Part V explains the importance of the perspectives phenomena
for an accurate understanding of the history of TRIPS, as well as
more recent conflicts. This Part concludes with a discussion of
how the perspectives theories are further supported by social
science research. Part VI concludes the Article.
II. THE COMPETING PERSPECTIVES
This Part posits that no single unifying view of patents is
correct. Rather, it suggests that there is a spectrum of views on
patents benchmarked by two very distinct and seemingly
irreconcilable perspectives. On one end, patents are a “mere”
privilege granted by a nation and are inherently subject to
limitations to ensure that patents do not impede other socially
desirable goals. At the other end of the spectrum, patents are
viewed as strong property rights that should seldom, if ever, be
encroached. This view of patent rights assumes that patents, and
greater patent rights, will necessarily lead to greater social
goods. The goal of this Part is not to choose a single view. Rather,
this Part aims to show that even the most extreme views can be
understandable—at least when viewed in isolation. As explained
in subsequent Parts, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for
competing perspectives to co-exist in the international spectrum
regardless of the existence of international laws. However, in this
Part, the focus is simply to sketch the outlines of the competing
perspectives. Parts III and IV will provide more detail through a
close examination of differing perspectives on compulsory
licenses.
A. Patent as Mere Privilege—A Moldable Tool
On one side of the spectrum of views is the conception that
patents are a tool inherently subject to limitations. While
many—including those with an uber-right view—may concur
that patents are a utilitarian tool to promote innovation by
providing an incentive or reward for new innovations, those who
view patents as a privilege do not necessarily place innovation as
a priority over all other social interests. Rather, promoting
innovation is only one goal amongst other competing societal
goals that inherently contemplate the need for balance.
Regardless of whether patents are legally considered property
rights, they may be viewed as a special type of property to those
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who see patents as a privilege. As stated by Professor Baker, who
14
is also associated with the Health Global Access Project, which
is dedicated to eliminating barriers to access to HIV treatment:
“Patents are not ‘property’ in the traditional sense—they are
government granted rights that are intended to balance the
interests of innovators and the public at large, and which are
granted by governments with many express and implied
15
conditions . . . .”
The U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights supports the idea
of patents as a privilege that must be “subject to limitations in
16
the public interest.” In particular, the United Nations has
suggested that certain human rights, such as the right to health,
are “inalienable and universal” rights that must be recognized
17
over state-granted rights such as patents. Moreover, the U.N.
Commissioner has suggested that to the extent that there are
“actual or potential conflicts,” patent rights should yield to the
18
right to public health.
If patents were conceived as a tool to promote innovation as
one among many societal goals, exceptions to ensure that the
patent purpose is served would seem reasonable. In particular,
while patents are assumed to provide an incentive to innovate, to
the extent that patents fail to provide appropriate incentives, or
actually interfere with additional innovation, modifications are
necessary. Accordingly, under the view of patents as privilege, a
nation would limit or craft exceptions to typical patent remedies
if doing so would promote greater innovation, such as the use of
patented inventions by researchers.
In the area of health care and access to medicine, the idea
that patents are a privilege has particularly dramatic
consequences. One possible view is that “the lives of patients

14.
The organization states that “[w]e believe that the human right to life and to
health must prevail over the pharmaceutical industry’s excessive profits and expanding
patent rights.” Health GAP Global Access Project, http://www.healthgap.org/hgap/
about.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2009).
15.
Baker, supra note 1.
16.
U.N. Office of High Comm’r for Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion
& Prot. of Human Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Resolution 2000/7].
17.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm’n on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights,
The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on
Human Rights, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) (suggesting that
rights under TRIPS, which are state-granted rather than inalienable, should, where
appropriate, bow to the more universal human rights, such as the right to health); accord
Resolution 2000/7, supra note 16, ¶ 3 (reminding “all Governments of the primacy of
human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements”).
18.
See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 16, pmbl., ¶ 3.
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have to come before the patents of drug companies,” such that
substantial modifications of patents are appropriate, particularly
if a nation places a premium on the right to health through
programs such as universal access to essential drugs, including
HIV treatment for all citizens. Accordingly, possible limitations
on a patent right to accommodate public health interests might
include limits on the scope of patentability, shorter patent terms,
and compulsory licenses.
The view of patents as a privileged tool does not necessarily
advocate abolishing all patents. However, considering patents
and the scope of their rights as a privilege injects more hesitation
into whether they should be granted in the first place. For
example, countries such as India and China could be seen as
embracing a view of patents as a privilege in their national
approaches to patents prior to TRIPS because they provided
patents on methods of making drugs, but not on drugs
20
themselves. The rationale of providing a patent incentive to
increase new methods of creating drugs, but not monopoly rights
on needed drugs, seems to fit with a view of patents as a tool to
promote progress in advancing other social interests, such as
broad access to low-cost drugs. Another example of a nation
viewing patents as privilege would be Canada. Until a trade
agreement with the United States required Canada to change its
21
laws, Canada broadly granted compulsory licenses on drugs to
22
increase access to medicine.
The view of patents as a privilege is also consistent with the
historical requirement of many nations to require a patent owner
to “work” the patent locally. Although there is currently some
question as to whether such a requirement would be consistent

19.
Press Release, Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, MSF Welcomes Move
to Overcome Patent on AIDS Drug in Thailand (Nov. 30, 2006), http://www.msfaccess.org/
media-room/press-releases/press-release-detail/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=20&cHash=f8040f62f5
(quoting Dr. David Wilson of Médecins Sans Frontières).
20.
See Ying Zhan, Patent Protection for Biotechnology in China: The Current
Legislation and the Proposed Third Amendment, 5 J. INT’L BIOTECH. L. 34, 34 (2008);
Xiaolu Wei, Drugs and Intellectual Property Rights, LAW@MIT, Fall 2006, at 2,
http://web.mit.edu/lawclub/www/lawjournal.html; infra text accompanying note 202
(providing an explanation for India’s prior approach to patents).
21.
See North American Free Trade Agreement art. 104, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
22.
However, although more constrained by international rules, Canada can still be
seen to take a privilege approach to its patent laws. For example, until a recent challenge
within the WTO, Canada allowed generic manufacturers of drugs to make and stockpile
drugs during the patent term to enable true competition with the patent owner—and
lower costs—on the very day of patent expiry. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 4.14, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
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23

with TRIPS, a number of countries have historically limited—or
entirely eliminated—patent rights if a patent owner failed to use
the patent in the nation that granted it. The requirement to
make the product locally was intended to help transfer the
24
technology to local citizens. The sanction for failure to work has
included total forfeiture of a patent or compulsory licensing, as a
25
less onerous punishment than complete patent forfeiture.
The privilege view would take a cautious approach towards
requiring patent rights globally. Because patents are seen as a
tool to promote innovation, and because there is literature to
support that patents alone are not adequate to support such
innovation, increasing patents globally would not be
26
encouraged. Rather, those who believe that patents are a
privilege would advocate allowing each nation to decide when
and whether to grant patents and how to define their scope.
Accordingly, those who view patents as a privilege would be
opposed to an international agreement that mandates patents.
However, to the extent that an international agreement was
required, those who view patents as a privilege would likely be
more amenable to an agreement that permitted national
discretion to recognize competing interests. Indeed, some of the
language in TRIPS can be seen as the handiwork of those who

23.
The United States challenged Brazil’s local working requirement. Request for
the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent
Protection, WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001); Request for Consultations by the United States,
Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000). However, the
parties came to a mutually agreed settlement, such that there has been no official WTO
analysis of whether local working is required or barred under TRIPS. Notification of
Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4
(July 19, 2001); see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY
AND ANALYSIS 359–61 (3d ed. 2008). In addition, the negotiation history of TRIPS reveals
a huge divide in viewpoints that do not seem to have ever been reconciled. See, e.g.,
Champ & Attaran, supra note 5, at 373–80 (discussing conflict between the United States,
the EU, and developing countries regarding local working of patents).
24.
Champ & Attaran, supra note 5, at 370–71.
25.
Compare Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5, Mar.
20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372 (“The patentee . . . shall be subject to the obligation of working his
patent conformably to the laws of the country into which he has introduced the patented
articles.”), with Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5, Mar. 20,
1883, as revised at The Hague Nov. 6, 1925, 47 Stat. 1789 (permitting revocation for
failure to use only “if the granting of compulsory licenses shall not suffice to prevent such
abuses”); see also, e.g., Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working
Requirements and Compulsory Licensing at International Law, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
243, 266–67, 285 (1997).
26.
E.g., COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 79–89 (3d ed. 2003) (suggesting that
increased patent rights may not be optimal for developing countries); Carlos M. Correa &
Sisule F. Musungu, The WIPO Patent Agenda: The Risks for Developing Countries 23
(Trade-Related Agenda, Dev. & Equity, Working Paper No. 12, 2002).

(3) HO

2009]

1/2/2010 6:53:49 PM

COMPETING PATENT PERSPECTIVES

1057

view patents as a privilege: Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS talk about
balancing patent rights, and Article 30 explicitly considers the
27
rights of third parties in limiting the rights of the patent holder.
B. Patents as an Uber-right
The alternative perspective views patents not as a privilege,
but rather, as a privileged property right, or an uber-right that is
stronger than other property rights. All rights have exceptions,
28
including property rights. Nonetheless, those who subscribe to
the uber-right view likely see any possible limitation on patent
rights as extremely suspect. While they recognize that property
rights may be limited, they nonetheless analogize legal
exceptions such as compulsory licensing to stealing. They suggest
that limits on patents should be exercised with caution because
the nature of the patent right is based entirely in the right to
exclude.
Those who see patents as an uber-right believe that patents
deserve an exalted status because they provide the necessary
reward to fuel innovation that benefits all of society. The high
costs of patented drugs are acknowledged, but most often in the
context of emphasizing the high costs and long path towards
29
drug discovery. To the extent that high costs of patented drugs
may impede access, proponents of uber-patent rights suggest
that the problem is one of poverty, such that any possible
30
solution lies outside patent law.
Although they recognize that access is limited during the
patent term by prices set by patent owners, they suggest that
patents benefit all. For example, Fred Hassan, Chairman and
CEO of major pharmaceutical company Schering-Plough,

27.
TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 7–8, 30.
28.
For example, the traditional property right may be limited by the nuisance
doctrine, as well as by takings.
29.
See Robert C. Bird, Developing Nations and the Compulsory License:
Maximizing Access to Essential Medicines While Minimizing Investment Side Effects, 37
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 216 (2009) (suggesting that consumers in developing countries
do not understand that the high cost of drugs reflects the less visible, but nonetheless
high costs of research and development in a broader discussion against use of compulsory
licensing).
30.
See Richard P. Rozek, The Effects of Compulsory Licensing on Innovation and
Access to Health Care, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 889, 896–97 (2000) (pointing to other
barriers to access). In addition, uber-right sympathizers are inclined to suggest that
problems related to the exclusivity of patent rights may pale in comparison to other
factors that increase the cost of medicine, such as tariffs and taxes that some countries
impose on imported drugs. E.g., Roger Bate, Death and Taxes: Why Taxes and Tariffs on
Medicines in Developing Nations Is a Fatal Policy, MED. PROGRESS TODAY, May 5, 2005,
http://www.medicalprogresstoday.com/spotlight/spotlight_indarchive.php?id=752.
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suggests that patent protection is actually responsible for low
cost generics:
IP protection for pharmaceutical innovation creates a
wonderful cycle. It rewards and incentivizes the huge
investments needed to create new medicines. Then, on
expiration of the patent, the innovation becomes freely
available to all. Generic drugs are thus the direct result of
IP-fueled innovation. They would not exist without IP. And
without IP, we would not see new advances in medicines
31
that in turn would become generic drugs.
Similarly, Professor Martin Adelman has suggested that the
question of access to medicine often overlooks the simple fact
that “without patents there would be far fewer drugs around for
people to access. One cannot have access to something that does
32
not exist.”
The uber-right perspective has invoked human rights norms
to support their position. In particular, they argue that inventors
have a right to benefit from the fruits of their invention based
upon language in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as
well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
33
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). While neither document refers
explicitly to either patents or intellectual property rights, both
include a clause about how everyone should enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and benefit from protection of interests from
34
any scientific production of which he is the “author.” The basic
argument is that if patent rights are minimized, the author
35
(inventor) is deprived of the protection of his interests.
31.
Fred Hassan, Chairman & CEO, Schering-Plough Corp., Keynote Address at
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 5th Annual Intellectual Property Summit, Fueling
Innovation: To Be Our Best for a Better World (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.phrma.org/
about_phrma/ceo_voices/fueling_innovation_to_be_our_best_for_a_better_world.
This
quote also illustrates a false dichotomy—the choice presented is patents versus no
patents, without considering the possibility of promoting innovation while simultaneously
providing access to cheaper generic medication.
32.
Martin J. Adelman, Compulsory Licensing of Drugs: TRIPS Context 1, Paper
Presented at ATRIP Annual Meeting in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.atrip.org/upload/files/activities/tokyo2003/s02-Adelman_art.doc.
33.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, art.
27(2), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR] (“Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
art. 15(1), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter ICESCR].
34.
UDHR, supra note 33, art. 27(2); ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 15(1).
35.
However, the same article has been read to support the perception of patents as
privilege—that consumers are entitled to enjoy the results of scientific progress in drug
discovery, such that they have actual access to medicine, and not merely theoretical
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If patents are uber-rights, they should be given more
protection than other rights. For example, although injunctions
are equitable remedies that typically require a court to consider
and balance a variety of factors including harm to the plaintiff,
the defendant, and the public interest, an uber-right perspective
may take a more extreme approach. In particular, the uber-right
view would hold that if a patent is found to be infringed, a
36
permanent injunction should be nearly automatic.
The uber-right perspective would want to limit any and all
exceptions to patent rights. Compulsory licenses would be
considered anathema to an uber-right perspective and only
37
permissible in the narrowest of circumstances. In particular, a
compulsory license would likely be considered valid only if the
38
patent owner was incapable of providing an adequate supply.
Extending the global reach of patents would also be
consistent with patents as an uber-right. In particular, some of
the arguments made in support of mandatory international
minimum rights for patents reflect this perspective. Prior to the
conclusion of TRIPS—the first international agreement setting
forth minimum patent rights—some suggested the need for
39
strong patent laws to promote innovation and prosperity. In
addition, they argued that strong patent systems would improve
the economic status of nations by promoting foreign direct
40
investment.
access based upon economic conditions beyond their control.
36.
This view has been espoused for years by the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., W.L.
Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988); H.H.
Robertson, Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“In matters
involving patent rights, irreparable harm has been presumed when a clear showing has
been made of patent validity and infringement.” (citing Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool
Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). This presumption derives in part from the
finite term of the patent grant. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has held that this view
is an incorrect reading of the law, at least with respect to copyright infringement. eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006). Even so, that may not
necessarily change existing perspectives.
37.
See, e.g., Rozek, supra note 30, at 890, 904.
38.
See e.g., Adelman, supra note 32, at 2.
39.
E.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 91 (2007) (noting that proponents of
TRIPS emphasized the importance of promoting intellectual property rights to incentivize
innovation); Negotiating Group of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of 25 March 1987, ¶ 4, MTN.GNG/NG11/1
(Apr. 10, 1987) (noting that greater protection of intellectual property rights was
necessary to provide incentives to innovate).
40.
See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World:
Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 698 n.16 (explaining the argument that increased intellectual
property protection may increase economic development, while simultaneously critiquing
its lack of empirical basis). But see Michelle McGrath, The Patent Provisions in TRIPS:
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Proponents of the uber-right perspective would argue for
strong international patent norms with minimal exceptions. They
would want to minimize as much as possible exceptions such as
compulsory licenses. Moreover, to the extent that prevailing
global norms seem to permit too many exceptions, those who
believe in uber-rights would want to change the norms, such as
by negotiating free trade agreements that create stronger patent
rights with narrower exceptions.
Those who believe in patents as an uber-right tend to not see
a conflict between strong patent rights and competing interests,
such as public health. The view is that because patent rights
necessarily promote innovation, possible long-term benefits
trump any current access problems. Moreover, the strong belief
in the value of patent rights is maintained in the face of evidence
that patent rights do not compel innovation in all areas; for
example, it is widely documented that patent rights do not
promote research into so-called “neglected diseases” that
primarily afflict poor countries that cannot afford to pay a patent
41
premium. Nonetheless, when there are discussions of limiting
patent rights, those who believe in patents as an uber-right
suggest that any limitations will sacrifice research into these
neglected diseases. For example, in response to Brazil’s
compulsory license of the HIV medication efavirenz, the major
pharmaceutical company Merck stated that “[t]his expropriation
of intellectual property sends a chilling signal to research-based
companies about the attractiveness of undertaking risky research
on diseases that affect the developing world, potentially hurting
patients who may require new and innovative life-saving
42
therapies.”
III. A CASE STUDY IN COMPETING PERSPECTIVES:
THAILAND’S COMPULSORY LICENSES
This Part illustrates competing perspectives of patents
through the lens of recent conflicts concerning compulsory
Protecting Reasonable Remuneration for Services Rendered—Or the Latest Development in
Western Colonialism?, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REP. 398, 400 (1996) (asserting that
“experience disproves the alleged connection between strict IP protection and foreign
investment”).
41.
COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 13
(2006) (noting how diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries receive
“essentially no commercially based R&D in the rich countries”).
42.
Press Release, Merck & Co., Statement on Brazilian Government’s Decision to
Issue Compulsory License for STOCRIN™ (May 4, 2007), http://www.merck.com/
newsroom/press_releases/corporate/2007_0504.html.
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licenses issued by Thailand. This Part begins with a
chronological background to Thailand’s actions. This Part then
presents separate vignettes to present the story of Thailand
versus PhRMA. The vignettes were not created by either party,
but should represent their beliefs because the information is
distilled from a ninety-page “white paper” issued by Thailand, as
43
well as numerous news articles and corporate press releases.
A. Background
Since 2002, Thailand, a lower middle-income country, has
offered its citizens universal access to medicine and has provided
access to antiretrovirals (ARVs) for patients with HIV since
44
2003. International agencies, including the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the World Bank, have recognized
Thailand’s success in providing treatment for those infected with
45
HIV. Thai HIV patients are similar to HIV patients globally;
they eventually need newer treatments as they build resistance

43.
See THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH & NAT’L HEALTH SEC. OFFICE, FACTS AND
EVIDENCES ON THE 10 BURNING ISSUES RELATED TO THE GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS
ON THREE PATENTED ESSENTIAL DRUGS IN THAILAND (Vichai Chokevivat ed., 2007),
available at http://www.moph.go.th/hot/White%20Paper%20CL-EN.pdf [hereinafter
WHITE PAPER]; THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH & NAT’L HEALTH SEC. OFFICE, THE 10
BURNING QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS ON THE FOUR ANTICANCER DRUGS IN THAILAND (2008), available at http://www.moph.go.th/hot/White%20
paper%20CL%20II%20FEB%2008-ENG.pdf [hereinafter TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON
CANCER DRUGS]; see also Roger Bate, Thailand and the Drug Patent Wars, HEALTH POL’Y
OUTLOOK, Apr. 2007, at 6, http://www.aei.org/outlook/25890 [hereinafter Bate, Thailand
and the Drug Patent Wars] (discussing history of Thailand compulsory licensing and
implications for Thai people and government); Roger Bate, Op-Ed., Thai-ing Pharma
Down, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Feb. 9, 2007, at 13 [hereinafter Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down]
(discussing effects of 2007 compulsory licensing for Thailand); Juliano Froehner,
Compulsory Licensing: Inevitable Failures of the Thailand Strategy in the Global Fight
Against HIV/AIDS (July 20, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author).
44.
National Health Security Act, B.E. 2545 § 5 (2002) (Thail.); see also Constitution
of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 § 51 (2007), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Rainer Grote
eds., 2008) (“A person shall enjoy an equal right to receive standard public health
service . . . .”).
45.
WHO & THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, EXTERNAL REVIEW OF THE HEALTH
SECTOR RESPONSE TO HIV/AIDS IN THAILAND 35 (2005), available at
http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/News_and_Events_ThailandProgrammeReviewNEW.
pdf [hereinafter EXTERNAL REVIEW] (noting Thailand’s achievement of national treatment
target from 2001 to 2004 of treating more than 50% of those in need of antiretroviral
treatment); ANA REVENGA ET AL., WORLD BANK, THE ECONOMICS OF EFFECTIVE AIDS
TREATMENT: EVALUATING POLICY OPTIONS FOR THAILAND 38 (2006) (reporting success
from 2002 to 2004 in increasing health care coverage and use while reducing household
out-of-pocket expenditures). Similarly, Doctors Without Borders described Thailand as
having “one of the gold standard treatment programmes for the developing world.” Amy
Kazmin & Andrew Jack, Thailand Breaks Patent for AIDS Drug to Cut Costs, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2006, at 9 (quoting Nathan Ford of Doctors Without Borders).
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to older drugs. However, newer treatments tend to be patented
46
and much more expensive.
A looming budget problem for Thailand’s continued
treatment of its HIV patients had previously been forecast, with
the idea of compulsory licensing explicitly mentioned as a
possible mechanism to provide cost-effective treatment by the
World Bank. At the same time, the World Bank noted that such
47
an approach would require “high-level political resolve.”
Thailand issued compulsory licenses to achieve its mandate
of providing access to essential drugs after years of negotiation
with patent owners failed to yield price cuts beyond the level of
currency appreciation. The licenses were issued to cover only
Thai citizens who are supported by government-funded insurance
and not the small percent of Thai citizens who are capable of
48
paying the premium patent prices for the drugs. Wealthy Thai
citizens would be required to purchase their own drugs at the
49
price set by patent owners.
Thailand issued three compulsory licenses over a period of
several months. Two were for patented drugs used in the
treatment of HIV and the third was for a heart disease
50
medication.

46.
First-line treatments are available cheaply as generic drugs, primarily from
India, which before 2005 did not provide patents on drug compounds. See, e.g., MÉDECINS
SANS FRONTIÈRES, WILL THE LIFELINE OF AFFORDABLE MEDICINES FOR POOR COUNTRIES
BE CUT? CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICINES PATENTING IN INDIA 2–3 (2005),
http://msf.fr/drive/2005-02-01-msf.pdf.
47.
See REVENGA ET AL., supra note 45, at 169–70.
48.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 6.
49.
Id.
50.
The first license was issued on November 29, 2006, for Merck’s patented drug
efavirenz (sold by Merck under the brand name Stocrin). DEP’T OF DISEASE CONTROL,
THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, EXERCISING OF RIGHT UNDER DRUGS AND
PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT (2006), reprinted in WHITE PAPER, supra note 43,
at 38, 39–40 [hereinafter EFAVIRENZ LICENSE]. Efavirenz is an effective first-line
treatment for HIV that has fewer adverse side effects than generic HIV drugs. Id. at 39.
Most developed countries treat all new patients with efavirenz. WHITE PAPER, supra note
43, at 13. The second licensed antiretroviral was issued on January 24, 2007, for Abbott’s
patented combination drug lopinavir and ritonavir, sold under the brand name Kaletra,
which is commonly used to treat HIV patients that build resistance to older drugs. DEP’T
OF DISEASE CONTROL, THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, EXERCISING OF RIGHT UNDER
DRUGS AND PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT FOR COMBINED FORMULATION OF
LOPINAVIR AND RITONAVIR (2007), reprinted in WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 41, 42–43
[hereinafter KALETRA LICENSE]. Abbott sold Kaletra in Thailand at a price of $2,200 per
patient per year—a cost that exceeds the $1,600 yearly income of the average Thai citizen.
Paul Cawthorne et al., Access to Drugs: The Case of Abbott in Thailand, 7 LANCET:
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 373, 373–74 (2007). The third license was issued on January 25,
2007, for Sanofi-Aventis’s heart disease drug Plavix, which the license notes is relevant to
treating one of the top three causes of death in Thailand; without the license, only 20% of
government-insured patients could access the drug, which is inconsistent with the
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In February 2007, Thailand issued a ninety-page white
paper, entitled “Facts and Evidences on the 10 Burning Issues
Related to the Government Use of Patents on Three Patented
Essential Drugs in Thailand,” including supporting documents to
defend its three compulsory licenses. Although the white paper
was meant to support Thailand’s position, some statements likely
induced additional concern. In particular, the document
telegraphed Thailand’s intent to consider issuing additional
licenses on up to 15% of patented drugs and that it would
consider a license warranted when the market price was
considered too high to achieve Thailand’s goal of universal access
51
to essential drugs.
Companies and countries began to react. Switzerland, home
to patent owner Novartis, published an “Aide Mémoire” in late
February 2008 in which it acknowledged that TRIPS provides for
compulsory licenses, but emphasized that they “should be used
only as a last resort” given that “[p]atents are of paramount
importance for the research and development of new
52
pharmaceuticals.” Abbott responded to the compulsory license of
its drug by withdrawing several drugs from the Thai marketplace
in March 2007, including a heat-stable form of Kaletra,
53
particularly well suited for the Thai climate. The U.S. Trade

universal coverage of essential medicines. THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, EXERCISING
RIGHT UNDER DRUGS AND PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT FOR CLOPIDOGREL
(2007), reprinted in WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 44, 44–46 [hereinafter PLAVIX
LICENSE].
51.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 12. The criteria for issuing a compulsory license
includes a listing on the National Essential Drug List; a need to solve public health
problems, emergencies, or epidemics; or a need to save lives where the price of the drug is
too high to be affordable by the government. Id. at 11. Thailand attempted to stem
concern by noting that “lifestyle” drugs, such as those to treat baldness, acne, or erectile
dysfunction would not be considered for compulsory licenses. Id. at 12; see also Sinfah
Tunsarawuth, 20 More Drugs in Pipeline for Possible Compulsory Licenses, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH, Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=806 (noting that
Thailand would probably only issue ten licenses out of twenty considered).
52.
Aide Mémoire: Compulsory Licences in Thailand on Pharmaceuticals Under
Patent Protection (Feb. 25, 2008) (on file with Houston Law Review), available at
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/1/swiss2thailand_cl.pdf.
53.
Erika Check, Abbott’s AIDS Fight-back, NATURE, July 5, 2007, at 14; see also
Editorial, Putting Meaning Back into TRIPS, BANGKOK POST, Mar. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.aegis.org/news/bp/2007/BP070308.html (arguing compulsory licensing is an
exercise of Thai citizens’ rights under TRIPS); Nicholas Zamiska, Abbott Escalates Thai
Patent Rift, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, at A9 (reporting Abbott withdrew a new version of
Kaletra that would be more convenient to take). In addition, patent owner Sanofi-Aventis
has threatened legal action against the Indian drug company Cadila that was to supply
low-cost versions of Plavix to Thailand. Rupali Mukherjee, Pharma Firms Under US
Pressure to Stop Generic Sale, TIMES INDIA, Feb. 13, 2008, available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2777692.cms; C.H. Unnikrishnan, Sanofi
in Talks with Thai Govt to Protect Its Patent Right, LIVEMINT.COM, Mar. 13, 2008,

OF
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Representative (USTR) elevated Thailand to Priority Watch
status on its Special 301 list, which may lead to unilateral trade
sanctions, as well as pressure to agree to a regional trade
54
agreement that increases patent protection.
Thailand continued to explore additional compulsory
licenses amidst the criticism. In June 2007, Thailand established
two exploratory committees to consider possible compulsory
55
licenses on cancer medications. At the same time, Thailand was
pressured against perceived broad use of compulsory licenses by
EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, as well as by the U.S.
56
Ambassador to Thailand, Ralph Boyce.
57
After initially promising negotiations stalled, Thailand
issued licenses on four cancer drugs in January 2008 on the eve
58
of a change in government administration. Thailand asserted
http://www.livemint.com/2008/03/13164842/Sanofi-in-talks-with-Thai-govt.html.
54.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 27
(2007); see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT
36–37 (2008) (maintaining Thailand’s status on the Priority Watch List because of
concerns of inadequate and ineffective protection of patent medicines along with concerns
over piracy and counterfeiting).
55.
Posting of Ed Silverman, Thailand May Break Patents on Cancer Meds, to
Pharmalot (June 22, 2007, 7:22 EST), http://pharmalot.com/2007/06/thailand-may-breakpatents-on-cancer-meds.
56.
Letter from Peter Mandelson, Eur. Union Trade Comm’r, to Krirk-krai Jirapaet,
Thai Minister of Commerce (July 10, 2007), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/
pijip_static/documents/mandelson07102007.pdf (noting concern about Thailand’s use of
compulsory licenses and asserting that “[n]either the TRIPS Agreement nor the Doha
Declaration appear to justify a systematic policy of applying compulsory licences wherever
medicines exceed certain prices”); Letter from Ralph L. Boyce, U.S. Ambassador to
Thailand, to Surayud Chulanont, Thai Prime Minister (July 20, 2007), available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2007-August/011610.html (noting concern
about potential issuance of additional compulsory licenses).
57.
Thailand began negotiations for lower prices on patented cancer drugs in
October 2007, but these negotiations eventually broke down in December 2007. TEN
BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 3–4.
58.
On January 4, 2008, licenses were issued on Docetaxel, the breast and lung
cancer drug by Sanofi-Aventis; Erlotinib, a drug for treating lung, pancreatic, and ovarian
cancer by Roche; Imatinib, a cancer drug patented and sold by Novartis as Glivec; and
Letrozole, a breast cancer medicine made by Novartis AG. THAI MINISTRY OF PUB.
HEALTH, EXERCISING OF RIGHT ON PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT FOR DOCETAXEL
(2008), reprinted in TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 22,
22–23 [hereinafter DOCETAXEL LICENSE]; THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, EXERCISING OF
RIGHT ON PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT FOR ERLOTINIB (2008), reprinted in TEN
BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 26, 26–27; THAI MINISTRY OF
PUB. HEALTH, EXERCISING OF RIGHT ON PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT FOR
LETROZOLE (2008), reprinted in TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note
43, at 24, 24–25; THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, EXERCISING OF RIGHT UNDER DRUGS
AND PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT FOR IMATINIB (2008), reprinted in TEN
BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 28, 28–29; see also Sinfah
Tunsarawuth, New Thai Minister May Review Compulsory Licences on Cancer Drugs,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/02/08/new-thaiminister-may-review-compulsory-licences-on-cancer-drugs (reporting that Thailand’s new
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that they were necessary because cancer is currently the number
one cause of death in Thailand, and most effective cancer
treatments are patented and thus inaccessible to most citizens
59
because of undue expense.
On February 7, 2008, the first day of taking office, the new
Thai Public Health Minister announced that he would reevaluate
60
the decision to issue licenses on the cancer drugs. Ultimately,
Thailand decided not to revoke any of the compulsory licenses
despite being told that the continued imposition of licenses
61
threatened to impact Thailand’s international trade. Some
suggested that canceling the licenses would be inconsistent with
the Thai constitution and other laws requiring the government to
provide low-cost drugs. Thailand has also resisted the suggestion
that it promise to forgo the option of compulsory licenses in the
future, arguing that to do so would be “a neglect of duty or failure
to exercise the rights established by the law to safeguard public
62
interest and public health.”
B. Thailand’s (Patent as Privilege) Perspective
Thailand is committed to the health of it citizens, even if
such commitment requires taking bold steps in the international
arena and potentially prompting the ire of more powerful
63
countries. Thailand is required to provide all Thais with access
64
to essential medicines, including drugs to treat HIV. Thailand’s

Public Health Minister may review compulsory licenses issued by previous government).
59.
Letter from Sanguan Nitayarumphong, Chair of the Subcomm. on Selecting the
Essential Drugs with Access Problems Under the Nat’l Health Ins. Schemes, to Mongkol
Na Songkhla, Minister of Pub. Health (Sept. 25, 2007), reprinted in TEN BURNING
QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 15, 17.
60.
Editorial, Bangkok’s Drug War, Round Two, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Feb. 27, 2008, at
13.
61.
Nopporn Wong-Anan, Thailand Will Override Cancer Drug Patents, REUTERS,
Mar. 10, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/healthNews/idUSBKK14764720080310.
62.
TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 11–12.
63.
See WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 4 (stating that compulsory licenses for
essential drugs are “clear evidence of the government’s commitment to put the right to life
above the trade interest”). Specifically regarding the economic impact of potential
international sanctions, the Thai Ministry of Public Health has noted the following:
[A]t least two-thirds of our economy depends on exporting of our goods and
services. . . . If the US government applies retaliation measures on our exports
which results in 10 percent reduction of exports to the US market, it will mean a
one to 1.2 per cent loss of economy and several hundred thousands job losses. So
this is a very sensitive issue. Unless there is very important need for the people
supported by solid evidences, we will not make these decisions.
Id. at 16.
64.
Since 2002, Thailand has had a mandate to achieve universal access to essential
medicines for all its citizens, with access to ARVs included since 2003. Id. at 1–2.
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commitment to health care has been recognized by international
agencies such as the World Bank and the World Health
65
Organization. Thailand believes in a public interest orientation
to patent rights with the view that patients must come before
66
profits.
Increasing drug costs have outstripped Thailand’s ability to
truly provide universal access to all necessary drugs. As
recognized by the World Bank and the WHO, Thailand needs to
use TRIPS flexibilities as HIV patients develop tolerance to
cheaper first-line ARVs. AIDS will become a death sentence,
rather than a long-term disease for patients who cannot obtain
second-line treatment. However, until Thailand’s bold action,
many patients were denied these essential drugs because they
are generally patented and priced beyond reach. For example,
Abbott set the annual price of Kaletra, a good second-line drug,
at $2,200 per Thai patient, where the average annual wage in
67
Thailand is only $1,600 per year. In addition, heart disease and
cancer are major sources of death in Thailand and no less serious
68
than AIDS. Without compulsory licenses on cancer drugs,
patients and their families will suffer either severe economic
69
hardship, including bankruptcy, or certain death.
Thailand carefully considered the implications of granting
compulsory licenses before doing so. In fact, Thailand attempted
to negotiate with each patent owner to reduce prices for years
70
prior to the actual licenses, but to no avail. While Thailand
65.
EXTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 45, at 35; REVENGA ET AL., supra note 45, at 4;
Letter from Tom Allen et al., Members of Congress, to Susan C. Schwab, U.S. Trade Rep.
(Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/congressionalschwabletter-thailand-10jan06.pdf (“Thailand’s HIV/AIDS treatment initiative has been
recognized as among the most successful in the developing world.”).
66.
Mongkol Na Songkhla, Preface to WHITE PAPER, supra note 43 (“The Thai
Ministry of Public Health firmly believes in a moderate and public interest oriented
approach to implement the intellectual property right. We are convinced and committed
to the view that ‘Public Health interest and the life of the people must come before
commercial interest.’”).
67.
Cawthorne et al., supra note 50, at 373–74; see also Open Letter,
Christopher Fournier, Int’l President, Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF’s Response to
Wall Street Journal Editorial on Compulsory Licenses in Thailand (Mar. 12, 2007),
available at http://doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=1957&cat=openletters (noting that second-line ARV medications cost “at best 5 times the price of current
first-line treatments and, in countries like Thailand, as much as 22 times!”).
68.
BRIEF REPORT OF THE OUTPUT FROM THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP FOR PRICE
NEGOTIATION OF THE PATENTED ESSENTIAL DRUGS, reprinted in WHITE PAPER, supra note
43, at 71, 71.
69.
DOCETAXEL LICENSE, supra note 58, at 22; TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER
DRUGS, supra note 43, at 2.
70.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 5; see also Robert Weissman, Op-Ed.,
Compulsory Licenses Are the Right Medicine, NATION (Bangkok), Feb. 23, 2008,
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could have continued to attempt such negotiations, past
experience indicates that companies are much more willing to
71
negotiate after a license has issued rather than before. Thailand
did not even need to undertake such negotiations. After all,
TRIPS clearly states that prior negotiations may be skipped not
only when there is a public health crisis, but also when the
license is for public noncommercial use, as Thailand’s clearly is
72
because the drugs are distributed for noncommercial public use.
Contrary to the bluster of pharmaceutical giants,
compulsory licenses are an essential part of national and
73
international laws. The WTO rules allow member states to issue
compulsory licenses to protect public health according to their
own criteria; indeed, the Doha Public Health Declaration clearly
affirms that each country has the “freedom to determine the
74
grounds upon which [compulsory] licences are granted.” No
emergency is required, nor is compulsory licensing limited solely
to ARV drugs. To the contrary, the Declaration, which was
unanimously adopted by all WTO member states in 2001,
provides that members “agree that the TRIPS Agreement does
not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to
75
protect public health.” Accordingly, it is puzzling that legal
licenses have been improperly characterized as theft and
76
breaking of patents.
Thailand is opening up a new market for pharmaceutical
companies rather than compromising existing markets. In
particular, the compulsory licenses simply enable more Thai
citizens to have access to essential drugs; those who can afford
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/02/23/opinion/opinion_30066217.php (“[T]here is
no question that the government undertook extensive negotiations before issuing the
recent licences on cancer products.”).
71.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 6.
72.
In accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, each license is issued for noncommercial use to protect public health and to
provide wider access to medicines in the case of emergency. E.g., EFAVIRENZ LICENSE,
supra note 50, at 39; KALETRA LICENSE, supra note 50, at 42; PLAVIX LICENSE, supra note
50, at 45.
73.
Cawthorne et al., supra note 50, at 374.
74.
Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(b); accord Letter from
Margaret Chan, WHO Dir.-Gen., to Mongkol Na Songkhla, Thai Minister of Pub. Health
(Feb. 7, 2007), available at http://www.cptech.org/blogs/ipdisputesinmedicine/2007/02/drmargaret-chan-to-dr-mongkoi-na.html (“The decision whether to issue a compulsory
license for a pharmaceutical product is a national one.”).
75.
Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 4; see Roger Bate & Richard
Tren, The WTO and Access to Essential Medicines: Recent Agreements, New Assignments,
HEALTH POL’Y OUTLOOK, Feb. 2006, at 1, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060216_
19636HPO200604_g.pdf (viewing the unanimously agreed-upon Doha Declaration as a
temporary fix for access to essential medicines until tariffs are lowered).
76.
See, e.g., Editorial, Theft in Thailand, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2007, at A8.
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the retail price will continue to pay that price from the patent
77
owner. Even though the compulsory licenses provide patent
owners with less profit than their preferred price, the patent
owners will still receive greater net profit than without the
compulsory licenses.
Thailand should not be punished for being more committed
to the health of its citizens than to the profits of multinational
78
pharmaceutical companies. In addition, Thailand’s budget is not
reduced with the compulsory licenses; such licenses simply
increase the number of citizens who receive access, rather than
reducing financial costs to Thailand. In fact, in some cases, more
79
money will be spent. In addition, the Thai drug market is less
than 0.5% of the global drug market, so the compulsory licenses
should have an insignificant effect on the profits of
80
pharmaceutical companies.
Thailand’s ability to use compulsory licenses to provide its
citizens with access to essential drugs is internationally
recognized. International organizations including the Clinton
Foundation and Doctors Without Borders have supported
Thailand’s actions; as President Clinton stated, “No company will
live or die because of high price premiums for AIDS drugs in
81
middle-income countries, but patients may.” Moreover, the
77.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 17 (“[I]t should be reiterated that the
Government Use of Patent does not touch on the out of pocket payment market, the
current market of the patented drugs. The Government Use only opens new market for
those who never have access to these drugs before.”).
78.
See, e.g., Press Release, Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF Welcomes Move to
Overcome Patent on AIDS Drug in Thailand (Nov. 29, 2006), http://doctorswithoutborders.org/
press/release.cfm?id=1905&cat=press-release&ref=tag-index (quoting Dr. Wilson of
Médecins Sans Frontières in Thailand as stating that “Thailand is demonstrating that the
lives of patients have to come before the patents of drug companies, and this policy needs
to be expanded to essential drugs that are expensive and in short supply, such as the
AIDS drug lopinavir/ritonavir, which currently costs over 7,000 baht a month (US$194)
and is far too expensive for Thailand.”).
79.
See WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 13, 15.
80.
Id. at 17 (“[T]he size of the Thai drug market is less than 0.5 per cent of the
global drug market. It is even less for the market of patented drugs. So there should not
be significant effect on the market and return of the research based drug companies.”).
81.
Marwaan Macan-Markar, Holding Big Pharma’s Feet to the Fire, ASIA TIMES
ONLINE, May 17, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IE17Ae02.html; see
also Letter from Peter Piot, Executive Dir., UNAIDS, to Mongkol Na Songkhla, Thai
Minister of Pub. Health (Dec. 26, 2006), reprinted in WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 84,
84 (commending Thailand for its “strong and steadfast efforts to provide access to
antiretroviral treatment”); Letter from Martin Khor, Dir., Third World Network, to
Mongkol Na Songkhla, Thai Minister of Pub. Health (Feb. 23, 2007), reprinted in WHITE
PAPER, supra note 43, at 87, 88 (“We share the belief that life and health are the most
important priority, and that providing the public with medicines (especially the poor who
cannot afford it otherwise) at affordable cost is a duty of government. We therefore
congratulate your actions to make use of the flexibilities of TRIPS . . . .”).
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WHO has stated that it supports use of TRIPS flexibilities by
82
developing countries to ensure access to affordable drugs. In
addition, over twenty U.S. congressmen supported the Thai
position in a letter asking the USTR to not exercise trade
83
pressure on Thailand.
Thailand’s licenses are consistent with the practice of many
nations. Over twenty-five countries have issued, or have
84
considered issuing, compulsory licenses. Wealthy countries,
including the United States and European countries, have issued
85
compulsory licenses and engaged in government use of patents.
The United States routinely issues compulsory licenses as a
remedy for anticompetitive actions and has threatened to issue
compulsory licenses in a variety of situations, including to supply
generic ciprofloxacin, and to permit government use of wireless
86
mobile devices commonly referred to as BlackBerries. If wealthy
countries are permitted to grant such licenses, Thailand should
not be denied the same right.
Thailand recognizes that its actions will subject it to political
pressure and vilification. However, Thailand strongly believes
that it must stand up to pressure from pharmaceutical
87
companies and the United States. Thailand is a world leader in
securing better treatment for its patients.
C. PhRMA’s (Patent as Uber-right) Perspective
Thailand has overruled the international patent system by
88
breaking patents on numerous medicines. Thailand’s military
82.
Letter from Margaret Chan, supra note 74.
83.
Letter from Tom Allen et al., supra note 65 (urging the United States to respect
the Thai compulsory license of efavirenz).
84.
See generally JAMES PACKARD LOVE, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, RECENT
EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSES ON PATENTS (2007), available at
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls_8mar07.pdf.
85.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 4 (“Thailand is not the first country to apply
compulsory licensing or the Government Use of patent, developed countries including the
USA, European countries, and other developing countries have previously attempted and
implemented compulsory licensing and Government Use of Patents.”); see also
Raymond C. Offenheiser, Letter to the Editor, WSJ.COM, Mar. 14, 2007,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117382283064835964.html (“[T]he United States has been
a major user of compulsory licensing . . . .”); Robert Weissman, U.S. Compulsory Licensing
and Government Use 1, Paper Presented at the International Conference on Compulsory
Licensing (Nov. 22, 2007) (on file with Houston Law Review) (“The United States is
probably the single greatest user of compulsory licensing in the world.”).
86.
LOVE, supra note 84, at 3.
87.
See Macan-Markar, supra note 81 (quoting Jiraporn Limpananont, associate
professor in pharmaceutical science at Chulalongkorn University, as stating that “[w]e
have to stand up to the pressure from the pharmaceutical companies and the US”).
88.
See Nirmal Ghosh, Thailand Breaks Patents for Heart and AIDS Drugs, STRAITS
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government is trampling the global patent system and
expropriating intellectual property as its own, rather than paying
89
its proper share.
Thailand is threatening a well-established global system for
90
innovation. Everyone knows that “without intellectual property
91
there is no innovation,” yet Thailand has “decided not to support
92
innovation by breaking the patents.” Although strong patents
benefit everyone, public debates improperly pit ignorant passion
93
against profit. Such activists blindly believe that the pipeline of
drugs will continue even if there is less funding—seemingly
oblivious to the fact that each new drug costs about a billion
94
dollars to develop.
In addition to being “very shortsighted,” Thailand’s actions
are selfish and will ironically compromise the health of everyone,
95
including its own citizens.
The costs of research and
development must be borne by someone. If Thailand is not
willing to contribute its share, then the rest of the world,
including countries at even lower stages of development, will be
required to shoulder the burden unnecessarily and in
contravention of a prior global accord to increase access to the
poorest countries. Higher prices for everyone besides Thailand
are simply unfair. As a middle-income country, Thailand should
be respecting patents to promote innovation and investment
opportunities. It is shocking that a country ranked 34 out of 181

TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 31, 2007, available at http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?
View,6405, (beginning news story with the assertion that “Thailand has overruled the
international patents system”); Darren Schuettler, Angered U.S. Firm Excludes Thailand
from New Drugs, REUTERS, Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/
companyNewsAndPR/idUSBKK26805820070314 (quoting an Abbott spokesman stating
that “Thailand has chosen to break patents on numerous medicines, ignoring the patent
system”).
89.
Cass, supra note 4 (characterizing Thailand’s actions as “trampling patents”);
see Editorial, supra note 76; Adelman, supra note 32, at 3–4; Letter from Kenneth L.
Adelman, Exec. Dir., USA for Innovation, to Members of Congress (May 9, 2007), available
at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2007-May/011154.html
(characterizing
licenses as “attacks on American intellectual property”).
90.
See Cass, supra note 4 (referring to licenses as a threat to the “world’s system of
protections for innovation”).
91.
A Gathering Storm, ECONOMIST, June 9, 2007, at 71 (quoting Fred Hassan of
Schering-Plough).
92.
Zamiska, supra note 53 (quoting Jennifer Smoter, spokeswoman for Abbott).
93.
See Ronald A. Cass, Op-Ed., Drug Patent Piracy, WALL ST. J. ASIA, May 7, 2007,
at 15 (stating that “IP protection benefits everyone” and that “[u]nfortunately, public
debates on IP rights are skewed to pit passion against profit”).
94.
Id. (asserting that activists opposed to IP rights “blindly assert that the drug
companies won’t stop inventing just because they will make less money”).
95.
Zamiska, supra note 53 (quoting Teera Chakajnarodom, president of Thailand’s
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturing Association).
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countries based on GDP would expect any public sympathy for
stealing patents—especially when it knowingly diverted funds
96
from health care to defense spending. Moreover, Thailand’s
reckless action will negatively boomerang against any further
97
economic growth. Why would any company be willing to invest
in Thailand after it has shown such reckless disregard of
property rights?
Compulsory licenses are antithetical to patent rights and
accordingly are granted rarely and under only very narrow
circumstances. Compulsory licenses are rarely employed by any
98
country, even if permitted under global rules. Such extreme
action is only permitted in extraordinary circumstances, such as
when a critical patent is not being used to produce essential
goods or when the patent owner cannot provide adequate
99
quantities of a drug in the event of a health emergency.
100
However, such situations are very rare. Moreover, such licenses
should be very limited because they inevitably provide a patent
101
owner with far less than a reasonable economic return.
Accordingly, global rules require that compulsory licenses be
102
used only as a last resort.
Sympathizers to Thailand’s position are simply opposed to
103
protection of all property rights.
Thailand’s action is not
96.
Cass, supra note 93.
97.
Id.
98.
See Editorial, supra note 4 (“[N]o serious government has contemplated using
compulsory licensing, even if it’s allowed to do so under WTO rules.”).
99.
Cass, supra note 4.
100.
Activists like to emphasize that provisions for compulsory licensing commonly
appear in U.S. statutes, but these characterizations are improper because such statutes
regulate a variety of activities that have nothing to do with the licensing of patented
drugs. See, e.g., Posting of Sidney Rosenzwieg, Bogus Reliance on the Clean Air Act’s
Compulsory Patent Licensing, to Progress & Freedom Foundation (Mar. 17, 2009, 14:20
EST), http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/03/jamie_loves_bogus_reliance_on_the_clean_air_
acts_c.html (observing that the Clean Air Act’s compulsory licensing provision for air
pollution control technology has never been invoked in its forty-year history). Moreover,
licenses issued as part of a remedy for actual anticompetitive conduct are similarly
irrelevant to the health care context. Finally, a denial of a permanent injunction is not a
compulsory license; while activists may try to equate the two as having comparable effect,
everyone knows that a compulsory license is something issued not by a court, but by a
government according to statute. E.g., Adelman, supra note 32, at 3.
101.
Cass, supra note 93 (“[C]ompulsory licenses—like any one-sided deal that
doesn’t require consent from the person whose property is taken—almost always leave the
rights holder with far less than a reasonable economic return.”).
102.
E.g., A Gathering Storm, supra note 91 (noting that Jon Pender of British
pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline insisted that a compulsory license was only to be
used “as a last resort”); Editorial, Drugs in Thailand, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at 14
(“WTO rules say compulsory licenses should be a last resort.”).
103.
See Cass, supra note 4 (stating that those who endorse compulsory licenses
“oppose protection of property rights in general and IP rights in particular”).
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surprising because authoritarian governments and social
104
activists take what is not theirs. Such sympathizers are just
the usual crowd of anti-patent hooligans that fails to understand
that without patents, there would be no drugs for anyone. These
anti-patent activists have tried hard to alter the meaning of
TRIPS and were behind the 2001 Declaration that permits
governments to deal with health emergencies posed by epidemics
105
of HIV in sub-Saharan Africa. However, that Declaration does
not support the compulsory license of any drug patent for any
reason, especially when a relatively developed country with no
epidemic, such as Thailand, simply wants to save costs by
106
stealing the property of another.
Thailand’s purported interest in fostering public health is
suspect. After all, Thailand’s recent compulsory licenses were
issued after a military-imposed government suspiciously raised
107
the defense budget by over $30 billion in recent years. Any
purported budget crisis should be viewed with skepticism
considering that the military-imposed Thai government gave
itself a huge pay increase, together with a substantial increase in
defense spending, while at the same time reducing the health
108
care budget. Why should pharmaceutical investment worldwide
suffer just because Thailand has elected to fund its defense
budget, rather than legitimately pay for drugs it uses? In
addition, why should Thailand’s medical budget be underwritten
by all other countries?
Thailand’s extraordinary bad faith in issuing the compulsory
licenses is evident at multiple junctures. First of all, Thailand did
not undertake any serious negotiations with patent owners.
Although Thailand repeatedly invokes TRIPS, it seems to gloss
over the fact that TRIPS requires patent owners to be consulted
104.
See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Op-Ed., Thai Patent Turmoil, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Mar.
13, 2007, at 13 (referring to “the free lunch crowd”).
105.
See Cass, supra note 4 (“While the system of IP protections has worked well to
encourage investment in innovations, some groups oppose protection of property rights in
general and IP rights in particular. Over the past decade, these groups have worked hard
to alter the meaning of the TRIPS agreement and to encourage any government that will
listen to use compulsory licensing to break IP protections.”).
106.
Id. (characterizing the Doha Declaration as a “small victory” for groups opposed
to protection of all property rights).
107.
Roger Bate, Thailand’s Creaking Health System, AMERICAN, June 9, 2008,
available at http://www.american.com/archive/2008/april-04-08/thailand2019s-creakinghealth-system; Don Pathan, Military Spending to Soar a Further 24%, NATION
(Bangkok), June 28, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/06/28/politics/politics_
30037960.php.
108.
Bate, supra note 107 (asserting that health spending in Thailand is now 3% of
GDP—down from 3.5% a few years ago—and that if Thailand simply spent an additional
1% of GDP, it would have more than $2 billion to spend on health care).
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109

prior to the imposition of a compulsory license. To the contrary,
patent owners were shocked to have their patents broken without
110
an attempt to first negotiate a reasonable price.
Thailand’s asserted health commitment is a sham. Thailand
only promulgated a universal access to health program as a
111
populist measure. Moreover, the licenses are issued to the
Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO), which is not
only historically corrupt, but also a state-owned monopoly for
112
profit. In addition, any drugs made by Thailand’s GPO will be
inferior to the actual patented product because the GPO facilities
113
have never met WHO standards. Poor products may lead to
drug resistance, or may be ineffective, which would only further
exacerbate costs. Any purported HIV resistance in Thailand is
likely due to its reliance on inferior drugs manufactured by its
114
own GPO.
The alleged need for HIV treatment in Thailand is similarly
a sham. There is no HIV epidemic in Thailand. Thailand has
relatively low rates of HIV infection, with less than 1% of the
population infected—a far cry from countries such as sub115
Saharan Africa where 20% of the population may be afflicted. If
Thailand has truly contained its HIV numbers, there is no need

109.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b).
110.
E.g., Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Letter to the Editor, WSJ.COM, Mar. 14, 2007,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117382283064835964.html (quoting Dr. Harvey Bale,
Director General of IFPMA, as stating that Thailand had “no serious contacts” with
patent owners prior to the imposition of the license); Schuettler, supra note 88.
111.
See Head, supra note 1 (“The nationwide health scheme was first introduced in
2001 by then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who had a gift for coming up with
populist policies that would keep getting him elected.”).
112.
See Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down, supra note 43 (“The only winner will be
Thailand’s historically corrupt Government Pharmaceutical Organization, or GPO, the
state-owned pharmaceutical monopoly.”); Editorial, Patently Wrong, WALL ST. J. ASIA,
Feb. 9, 2007, at 12 (stating the licenses are a “boon” for the GPO).
113.
E.g., Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down, supra note 43 (reporting that GPO drugs
“are at best approximate copies” and that even with lax WHO standards, 18 different
“WHO approved” HIV treatments have been withdrawn in 2005 due to lack of proof that
the drugs actually worked); Editorial, supra note 76.
114.
Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down, supra note 43 (“Drugs that are not pre-qualified
[WHO approved] may not directly kill people, but they could foster resistance to AIDS
drugs.” (quoting Lembit Rago, WHO coordinator of drug quality & safety)). Bate states
that a 2005 study by Thailand’s Mahidol University found that GPO-vir, an HIV
treatment produced by GPO, had between 39.6% and 58% resistance, which is perhaps
the worst case of HIV drug resistance in the world. Id.
115.
Christopher C. Horner, Thailand Stealing out of WTO?, WASH. TIMES, May 17,
2007, at A15; Editorial, supra note 76; see also Cass, supra note 104 (“Thailand today has
a relatively low rate of HIV/AIDS compared to much of the developing world, has enjoyed
notable success in reducing the rate of new infections (cutting the annual increase to
about 13% of its level a decade before), and has seen a dramatic decrease in its AIDS
death rate since 2000.”).
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for compulsory licenses of drugs. Moreover, to the extent that
HIV is a problem, it is one that is fostered by Thailand’s own
116
lucrative sex trade.
The argument that there could be any emergency that
justifies breaking the patent on Plavix is completely laughable
and also highlights Thailand’s extremely inappropriate action.
There is clearly no threat of an epidemic based on heart disease
117
because it is not an infectious or contagious disease. Moreover,
to the extent that Thai citizens suffer from heart disease, the
“problem” they suffer from is simply that they are wealthy
118
enough to buy and consume large quantities of unhealthy foods.
Citizens with such wealth should be able to pay the fair price for
medication. Alternatively, they should take better care of their
health. Breaking a patent is completely unjustified in the case of
a condition like heart disease that reflects an unhealthy choice of
lifestyle undertaken by affluent citizens.
In addition, patents are not the problem; poor health
systems are a much bigger problem than the prices of drugs.
Besides, drugs are already provided free or at low cost to
countries around the world when they are truly needed.
However, Thailand’s economy is in no way comparable to the
countries that receive such low-cost drugs, such as sub-Saharan
119
Africa.
Thailand is cutting the wrong corners; instead of
breaking patents, it should address corruption in the health
120
services industry and provide better health training.
Thailand’s actions are not only suspicious, but also
inconsistent with TRIPS. TRIPS only permits such licenses in
limited circumstances, such as a national health emergency, and
even then only after legitimate and lengthy efforts have been

116.
See, e.g., Bate, Thailand and the Drug Patent Wars, supra note 43, at 2 (noting
that Thailand’s AIDS epidemic is “fueled by its notorious sex industry”).
117.
See Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down, supra note 43 (opining that “it’s hard for
anyone to argue that heart disease meets” the criteria of a health emergency); Roger
Bate, Op-Ed., Thailand’s Patent Attack, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 13, 2007, at 9, available at
http://www.nysun.com/opinion/thailands-patent-attack/48499 (asserting that heart
disease and leukemia are not epidemics).
118.
See Ghosh, supra note 88 (asserting that heart disease afflicts the affluent).
119.
See CIA, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2009) (comparing each
country’s GDP).
120.
See Bate, supra note 107 (alleging that other problems beyond drug costs are a
problem, including poorly paid medical workers and corruption in the health care
industry that are exacerbated by limited government funding); Bate, Thai-ing Pharma
Down, supra note 43 (“[T]he real risk to the poorest of the ill, and HIV sufferers in
particular, is not drug prices but bad health systems and poor training of medical
professionals.”).
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121

made to negotiate with the patent owner. There is no specific
provision in TRIPS that permits Thailand to issue licenses on
drugs that treat conditions that are not epidemics. Thailand has
clearly violated the spirit, if not the letter, of TRIPS by taking
such extreme action in exploiting the vaguely worded TRIPS
122
agreement to simply balance its budget. There is no mention in
TRIPS that licenses can be used to get more drugs than a nation
can legitimately pay for. After all, everyone knows that the goal
of TRIPS was to ensure that patents were given increased, rather
123
than reduced, protection. Otherwise, innovation will fail and
there will be no drugs to supply to the Thai market or any
market in the world.
The inappropriateness of Thailand’s action is broadly
recognized in the international community. As stated by
Switzerland, “patents are part of the solution to long term access
to innovative medicines in Thailand,” such that compulsory
licenses must be used “only in emergencies and other exceptional
cases” or else the entire patent system will be undermined, and
with it, the “incentive to invest in research and development of
124
new and more effective medicines.”
Similarly, the EU
Commissioner of Trade has repeatedly written to Thailand to
clarify that compulsory licenses are inappropriate to use as a
standard business practice because that will inevitably be
detrimental to the development of new medicines and to insist
125
that Thailand stop such inappropriate use. Even the DirectorGeneral of the WHO has recognized that patent protection is
critical and that compulsory licenses must be pursued
126
cautiously.
Thailand’s repeated stealing of drugs must be condemned.
Abbott’s decision to withdraw new drugs from the Thai market is
very reasonable because Thailand has indicated that it will take
127
others’ property if given the opportunity.
It is completely
121.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b).
122.
Editorial, supra note 76; Lonely Thailand, WALL ST. J. ASIA, May 23, 2007, at
11.
123.
TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 7–8.
124.
Aide Mémoire, supra note 52.
125.
Letter from Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Comm’r, to Krirkkrai Jirapaet, Thai
Minister of Commerce (Sept. 10, 2007), available at http://www.vittorioagnoletto.it/
uploads/file/Mandelson4.pdf.
126.
Editorial, supra note 76 (quoting WHO’s Director-General as stating, “I’d like to
underline that we have to find a right balance for compulsory licensing . . . . We can’t be
naive about this. There is no perfect solution for accessing drugs in both quality and
quantity.”).
127.
See Zamiska, supra note 53 (“Pharmaceutical executives say the Thai
government’s decision, which they say effectively steals the drugs from the companies
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inappropriate for a middle-income country to steal from
companies.
Thailand’s actions also destroy a fragile global framework.
Companies currently provide a tiered pricing system. They
already provide drugs at higher costs to wealthy countries so that
128
they can provide drugs at low or no cost in poorer markets.
However, this is only sustainable if it can provide some profits in
middle-income countries that can afford to pay. If other middleincome countries follow Thailand’s bad example, the entire
structure of subsidizing drugs to poor countries will collapse. Not
only will this result in less access to drugs for poor countries,
but it will also reduce incentives for all drug development,
including drugs that address the needs of developing
129
countries.
IV. IMPACT OF PERSPECTIVES ON
COMPULSORY LICENSING CONTROVERSY
Although the prior Part provided a holistic flavor of how
perspectives color Thailand’s licenses, this Part endeavors to
provide a deeper description of how perspectives have influenced
the dialogue. In particular, this Part focuses on how perspectives
have played a key role concerning discussion of whether
Thailand’s actions are proper under TRIPS.
What may not be evident from the vignettes is the
tremendous emphasis on different issues by the privilege versus
uber-right perspective. The privilege perspective generally begins
all discussions with an emphasis on the legality of Thailand’s
actions under TRIPS. The uber-right, on the other hand, often
gives short shift to even discussing TRIPS and instead argues
that the stealing of patent rights will doom innovation to the
detriment of all. The privilege perspective predictably interprets
any ambiguity in TRIPS provisions in favor of justifying
Thailand’s actions. However, the uber-right’s de-emphasis of the
rule of law is somewhat surprising—except as a reflection on the
importance of entrenched perspectives. The importance of such a
perspective may account for the fact that many editorials
promoting an uber-right perspective do not even discuss TRIPS,
that own them, has left the industry with little choice.”).
128.
Roger Bate & Kathryn Boateng, Drug Pricing and Its Discontents: At Home and
Abroad, HEALTH POL’Y OUTLOOK, Aug. 2007, at 1–2, http://www.aei.org/outlook/26622.
129.
See, e.g., Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down, supra note 43 (“If other countries follow
Thailand’s lead and demand no-profit African pricing, then the incentives for further drug
development are weakened, especially for diseases uniquely affecting the Asian region,
such as dengue fever and leishmaniasis.”).
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or, alternatively, refer to TRIPS vaguely as a legal technicality
130
that does not merit any discussion.
This Part will demonstrate how the competing perspectives
have introduced confusion into clear text and raised red herrings
that detract from issues in need of actual attention. While some
would simply accuse patent-owning pharmaceutical companies of
obfuscation, this Part suggests an alternative explanation that is
consistent with the perspective theory. The first section shows
how the strength of the uber-right perspective has produced
interpretations of TRIPS that seem to defy its clear text. The
second section highlights non-issues that have been raised that
mask legitimate TRIPS issues in need of interpretation.
A. Legal Framework: TRIPS Article 31
TRIPS generally requires all member countries to provide
131
patents to inventions that are new, useful, and nonobvious. In
addition, countries must generally provide patent owners with
132
the right to exclude others from their inventions. However,
133
TRIPS also provides exceptions to the usual patent rights. The
relevant TRIPS exception that permits compulsory licensing is
134
Article 31, which states:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use [than that
permissible under TRIPS Article 30] of the subject matter
of a patent without the authorization of the right holder,
including use by the government or third parties authorized
by the government, the following provisions shall be
respected:
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its
individual merits;
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use,
the proposed user has made efforts to obtain
130.
E.g., Benjamin Krohmal, Knowledge Ecology Int’l, Notes from March 16th 2007
U.S. Capitol Briefing on Thailand’s Compulsory Licenses (Mar. 16, 2007),
http://keionline.org/print/book/export/html/426 (referring to a statement by PhRMA’s
Richard Kjeldgaard that his speech “would not focus on the legal technicalities of
compulsory licensing”).
131.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27.1.
132.
Id. art. 28.1.
133.
Id. arts. 30–31.
134.
Although this provision does not use the term “compulsory licenses,” it is widely
acknowledged to govern the proper use of compulsory licenses. See, e.g., CORREA, supra
note 39, at 313 (suggesting that Article 31 covers compulsory licenses even without
express use of that term); GERVAIS, supra note 23, at 390 (“[Article 31] deals with what
are traditionally referred to as compulsory or non-voluntary licences.”); UNCTAD-ICTSD,
RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 460 (2005) (using the term “compulsory
licenses” in the heading of the chapter focused on Article 31).
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authorization from the right holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts
have not been successful within a reasonable period of
time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in
the case of a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
non-commercial use. In situations of national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,
the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon
as reasonably practicable. In the case of public noncommercial use, where the government or contractor,
without making a patent search, knows or has
demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or
will be used by or for the government, the right holder
shall be informed promptly;
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to
the purpose for which it was authorized . . . ;
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive;
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part
of the enterprise or goodwill which enjoys such use;
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the
supply of the domestic market of the Member
authorizing such use;
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to
adequate protection of the legitimate interests of the
persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the
circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are
unlikely to recur. The competent authority shall have
the authority to review, upon motivated request, the
continued existence of these circumstances;
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in
the circumstances of each case, taking into account the
economic value of the authorization;
(i)

the legal validity of any decision relating to the
authorization of such use shall be subject to judicial
review or other independent review by a distinct higher
authority in that Member;

(j)

any decision relating to the remuneration provided in
respect of such use shall be subject to judicial review or
other independent review by a distinct higher authority
in that Member;

(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set
forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use is
permitted to remedy a practice determined after
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While a complete analysis of this provision is beyond the
scope of this Article, some highlights will be summarized here as
136
a backdrop to analyzing the competing perspectives. Article 31
permits, but does not require, member states to issue compulsory
licenses; however, if they do so, they must follow a number of
procedural requirements. There is no limitation to use of
compulsory licenses by poor countries; Article 31 applies
whenever the laws of any WTO country provides for compulsory
137
licenses. Although many assume that TRIPS limits the subject
matter available for compulsory licensing, that is not the case.
Rather, TRIPS focuses on ensuring that proper procedures take
place, such as considering the “individual merits” of each
compulsory license, rather than providing blanket licenses of
138
entire categories of subject matter. Similarly, TRIPS requires
providing “adequate remuneration” to the patent owner for use of
the patent, and generally requires prior negotiation with the
patent owner before issuing a compulsory license, although there
are three situations where prior negotiation may be waived: a
national emergency, a situation of extreme urgency, or public
139
noncommercial use.
In addition, although an early draft
suggested that compulsory licenses should be generally
140
minimized, the final text contains no such limitation. The only
restriction to the scope of compulsory licenses is on the level of
individual patents—the scope and duration of individual licenses
141
are to be limited to the authorized purpose.
Subsequent to TRIPS, all WTO members at the Doha
Ministerial Conference agreed to a Declaration on Public Health
135.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31.
136.
For a more complete analysis of Article 31, including whether Thailand’s
licenses comply with Article 31, see Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?:
Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
371, 387–411 (2009).
137.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31. There are other provisions of TRIPS that apply
only to developing countries. See, e.g., id. art. 65 (providing transitional provisions for a
“developing country”). The absence of the qualifier “developing country” in Article 31 thus
suggests that there was no intent to limit this provision to such countries.
138.
Compare TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(a) (requiring licenses be considered on
“individual merits”), with Patent Act, 1923 S.C., ch. 23, art. 24 (Can.) (allowing the
Commissioner to grant compulsory licenses for any invention by a public servant that
relates to the nature of his employment).
139.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b), (h).
140.
For example, a 1990 draft suggested that parties “shall minimise the grant of
compulsory licences in order not to impede adequate protection of patent rights.” Draft of
July 23, 1990, W/76, reprinted in GERVAIS, supra note 23, at 387.
141.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(c).
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The
that provides further clarification on Article 31.
Declaration is not an amendment to TRIPS. However, that does
not mean that it is not relevant. To the contrary, the relevant
rules for interpreting international laws give primary weight to
the “ordinary meaning” of the text of a treaty in its appropriate
context, which includes subsequent agreements between all
143
parties to the treaty. Most scholars who have analyzed this
issue have concluded that the Declaration is in fact a subsequent
144
agreement. Patent owners, on the other hand, tend to discount
the Declaration as merely a political statement of no
145
consequence.
The Declaration will be discussed here as a
relevant interpretative device.
However, even if the Declaration were not utilized, the
interpretation of TRIPS Article 31 should be the same because
the Declaration simply makes explicit principles already set forth
under TRIPS. For example, the Declaration plainly states that
“[e]ach Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and
the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences

142.
Compare Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(a)–(c), with
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b).
143.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.1, Mar. 21, 1986, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.”); id. art. 31.3(a) (noting that the context should include “any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions”).
144.
See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 45 (2002), available at http://www.who.int/
medicines/areas/policy/WHO_EDM_PAR_2002.3.pdf; Denis Borges Barbosa, Margaret
Chon & Andrés Moncayo von Hase, Slouching Towards Development in International
Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 131–32; Steve Charnovitz, The Legal
Status of the Doha Declarations, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 207, 211 (2002); Susy Frankel, WTO
Application of “the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law” to
Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 400–01 (2006); Carmen Otero GarcíaCastrillón, An Approach to the WTO Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 212, 212 (2002); James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291, 314–16 (2002).
145.
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. TRADE POLICY GUIDANCE ON
WTO DECLARATION ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES MAY NEED CLARIFICATION 3–4 (2007); Press
Release, PhRMA, WTO Doha Declaration Reaffirms Value of Intellectual Property
Protection (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.aegis.com/NEWS/PR/2001/
PR011126.html. However, not everyone sympathetic to patent rights has dismissed the
Declaration. For example, Professor Alan Sykes noted that while ministerial
declarations under the WTO are not legally binding for dispute resolution purposes, the
Doha Public Health Declaration “is primarily interpretative of imprecise obligations in
TRIPS, and does not appear to contradict any textual provision. As such, it is likely to
be persuasive authority . . . in the event of a dispute.” Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS,
Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47,
54 (2002).

(3) HO

2009]

1/2/2010 6:53:49 PM

COMPETING PATENT PERSPECTIVES

1081

146

are granted.” However, there is nothing in Article 31 that
would contradict this statement because Article 31 simply
provides provisions that should be respected by countries
granting compulsory licenses, without requiring the approval of
any other country or entity. Although Article 31 permits
compulsory licenses to be challenged, the challenge occurs within
147
the country granting the license.
In addition, the Doha
Declaration further states that “[e]ach Member has the right to
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
148
urgency.” Again, this statement is consistent with Article 31,
although it does provide additional clarification; in particular,
TRIPS states that a national emergency or circumstances of
extreme urgency are possible grounds for waiving the usual
requirement to first negotiate with the patent owner, but TRIPS
149
does not define when such terms occur.
Under general
principles of interpretation, undefined terms in TRIPS permit
member states to self-define. What the Doha Declaration adds is
a broader consensus of examples of particular diseases that
150
should fit this definition. However, the general principle that
member nations have the right to define the undefined key terms
of national emergency and extreme urgency is inherent in
TRIPS.
B. Distorted TRIPS Interpretations Fostered by an Uber-right
Perspective
This section highlights the most extreme impact of patent
perspectives to a proper understanding of TRIPS. It is important
146.
Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(b).
147.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(i).
148.
Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(c).
149.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b).
150.
However, there remains debate as to whether these are the only diseases
permissible for compulsory licenses. In particular, the United States has contended that
these are the only possible emergencies, while developing countries have argued for a
broader interpretation. See, e.g., MARY MORAN, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, RENEGING ON
DOHA (2003), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/msf052003.pdf; Chakravarthi
Raghavan, TRIPS Consultations on Implementing Doha Recessed, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK, Nov. 29, 2002, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/5246a.htm; Brook K. Baker,
Doha Redux—U.S. Enters New Phase of Bad Faith Bargaining (July 2, 2003),
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/hgap07022003.html; Deadlock over Scope of Diseases
Threatens to Kill Solution (Nov. 27, 2002), http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/
ngos11272002.html.
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to first recall that the prior section noted that TRIPS provides no
limits to what patents may be licensed, as well as no restrictions
to countries that can use compulsory licenses. Moreover, the
Doha Public Health Declaration has reinforced these rules.
Nonetheless, these rules have been repeatedly contradicted and
distorted by patent owners and others holding an uber-right
view. This section is not intended to demonize those perspectives.
Rather, the goal is to show the power of perspectives in convincing
adherents to adopt positions inconsistent with clear text.
1. Mythical Emergency Limitation. There are two
variations propagated by the uber-right perspective concerning
the extent to which an emergency is relevant to a compulsory
license. First, there are statements suggesting that a compulsory
license is only appropriate if a national emergency or health
crisis exists. This is false because TRIPS only mentions national
emergencies as relevant when issuing a compulsory license
151
without prior negotiation. As noted above, TRIPS does not
restrict what subject matter may be licensed, and the Doha
Public Health Declaration affirms that each member state has
the “freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences
152
are granted.”
Second, some acknowledge that a national
emergency is not always required, but still misstate TRIPS rules
by omitting public noncommercial use as a ground for issuing a
compulsory license without prior negotiation. Examples of each of
these are shown below.
a. Clear Misstatements that an Emergency Is Always
Required. Those holding an uber-right view have repeatedly
suggested that compulsory licenses must be limited to a narrow
class of cases. For example, Roger Bate, a fellow of the
conservative think tank American Enterprise International
(AEI), stated that compulsory licenses are permissible if “efforts
to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions have failed, or in cases of
153
national emergency.” Along similar lines, Tim Wilson, Director
of the conservative think tank Institute of Public Affairs, stated
that “Section 31(b) of the TRIPS agreement allows for
compulsory licensing of patented technologies in cases of national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases
151.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b).
152.
Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(b).
153.
Roger Bate, Thailand’s Drug Wars, AMERICAN, Mar. 12, 2008,
http://www.american.com/archive/2008/march-02-08/thailand2019s-drug-wars
(internal
quotation marks omitted).
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154

of public non-commercial use.” By failing to state that these
conditions are only relevant when prior negotiation with the
patent owner is waived and omitting all other criteria, the reader
is left with the impression that these are the actual grounds for
issuing a license.
The perceived “requirement” of an emergency extends
beyond patent owners to all that maintain an uber-right
perspective. For example, a U.S. report on Foreign Trade
Barriers states that “[t]he United States acknowledges
Thailand’s ability to issue compulsory licenses to address public
health emergencies,” which may sound permissive, but actually
suggests that an emergency is required for a compulsory
license—in conflict with the Doha Declaration’s clear statement
155
that member states get to decide the appropriate grounds.
Similarly, a letter from several senators to U.S. Trade
Representative Schwab states:
We strongly support WTO rules that recognize the rights of
countries to consider actions, including compulsory
licensing, to address urgent public health needs, such as
those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and
other pandemics. But we do not believe that WTO members
intended those rules to be used to allow compulsory licenses
156
on any medicine whatsoever . . . .
However, nothing in TRIPS states that compulsory licensing is
limited to urgent health needs. As pointed out by a different
group of congressmen, “TRIPS does not limit compulsory licenses
to ‘emergencies,’” and instead grants each nation the ability to
157
assess when licenses should be granted. Perhaps even the
congressmen with an uber-right approach to patents realize that
their view does not comport with the actual interpretation of
TRIPS, such that they specifically emphasized their belief of
what WTO members intended, instead of noting that proper
interpretation of international law requires that the text
primarily controls.
154.
TIM WILSON, INST. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, UNDERMINING MITIGATION TECHNOLOGY 4
(2008), available at http://www.ipa.org.au/library/publication/1219192134_document_
wilson_mitigationtechnology.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted).
155.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS: THAILAND (2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2008/NTE/asset_upload_file823_14611.pdf.
156.
Letter from Joseph I. Lieberman et al., Members of Congress, to Susan Schwab,
U.S. Trade Rep. (Mar. 20, 2007) (emphasis added), available at http://www.keionline.org/
misc-docs/liebermanplus4.pdf.
157.
Letter from Henry A. Waxman et al., Members of Congress, to Susan Schwab, U.S.
Trade Rep. (Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://waxman.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Letter_
to_US_Trade_Representative_Susan_Schwab_Urging_Focus_on_Access_to_Medicines.pdf.
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Another example of the force of an uber-right perspective
lies in the writings Juliano Froehner, an assistant professor at
the University of São Paulo Brazil, who states that although
“negotiators did authorize signatory nations to decide what
constitutes a public health emergency that would warrant a
CL[,] . . . it was and is understood that compulsory licenses are
intended to be used rarely and in response to genuine
158
emergencies.” He argues that compulsory licenses should be
limited to cases of ‘“public health crises, including those relating
to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics,’ which
represent a ‘national emergency or other circumstances of
159
While the quoted material accurately
extreme urgency.”’
reflects a statement in the Doha Public Health Declaration, the
entirety of the statement fails to capture the broader message
that those examples are merely illustrative of what constitutes
an emergency if prior negotiation with the patent owner is
waived. The more important statement under Doha—that
nations have the right to determine the grounds of compulsory
licenses—is importantly omitted.
b. Mistake by Omission—An Emergency Is Not the Only
Time When Prior Negotiation with the Patent Owner May Be
Waived. A less distorted, but nonetheless incomplete,
characterization of TRIPS is the belief that the only condition
authorizing a country to issue a compulsory license without prior
negotiation is that there is a national emergency—or perhaps a
case of extreme urgency. This is in clear contradiction to the
actual text of TRIPS, which permits waiver of prior negotiation
160
in the case of extreme urgency or public noncommercial use.
158.
Froehner, supra note 43, at 5. Whether Professor Froehner continues to hold
these views is an open question because the quoted material has since been removed from
its earlier location on the web.
159.
See, e.g., Froehner, supra note 43, at 2 (quoting Doha Public Health Declaration,
supra note 11, ¶ 5(c)) (“CLs are permitted by the World Trade Organization in exceptional
circumstances . . . . According to the WTO, circumstances in which they are appropriate
include ‘public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria
and other epidemics,’ which represent a ‘national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency.’” (quoting Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(c))).
Similarly, the Doha Declaration has been selectively quoted to give the impression that
these are the only situations where licenses are permissible. For example, the uber-rights
perspective will quote from the Doha Declaration that countries have the “right to
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.” See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 154, at 5. However, what is omitted from the
discussion is that the prior sentence of the same document explicitly states that “[e]ach
Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the
grounds upon which such licences are granted.” Doha Public Health Declaration, supra
note 11, ¶ 5(b) (emphasis added).
160.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b).
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However, the misconception is repeatedly emphasized by those
with an uber-right perspective not only in the mainstream
161
media —although they could potentially be simply parroting the
162
vocal uber-right—but in academic presses as well. For example,
the Economist quotes Jon Pender of GlaxoSmithKline as saying
that “although compulsory licensing is legal, TRIPS rules allow it
only under limited circumstances, such as national health
emergencies, and only after lengthy efforts to negotiate prices
163
with firms.” Although the article clearly notes the source and
that GlaxoSmithKline is a “British drugs giant,” thus suggesting
some self-interest, there is nothing in the article to contradict
164
this position as possibly inaccurate.
Another article acknowledges that Article 31(b) is about
prior negotiation, yet still provides an incorrect reading. In
particular, the article provides a block quote of Article 31(b),
which clearly states that prior negotiation “may be waived by a
Member in the case of national emergency or other circumstances
165
of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.”
However, in the very next sentence, it is stated that a compulsory
license without initial negotiation is permissible “only in
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of
166
extreme urgency.” This concluding sentence manages to ignore
the very text it cites in excluding noncommercial uses as a
permissible basis to waive the usual requirement of prior

161.
See, e.g., PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. ASS’N, PARTNERING FOR BETTER HEALTH:
AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE 26 (2007), available at http://www.qplushost.com/portfolio/
prema/upload/publications/PReMAWhitePaper_Thai_English.pdf (suggesting by omission
that the Doha Public Health Declaration only affirms the right to use flexibilities for
health crises and emergencies); Bate, supra note 153 (neglecting to mention public
noncommercial use as a possible grounds for issuing a license without prior negotiations);
Bate & Boateng, supra note 128, at 4; Editorial, supra note 60; Nicholas Zamiska, Thai
Move to Trim Drug Costs Highlights Growing Patent Rift, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at
A8 (“World Trade Organization rules allow a government to unilaterally declare an
emergency and make or sell patented drugs without the permission of the drug
companies.”).
162.
E.g., MAY & SELL, supra note 5, at 171 (noting an exception for a “national
emergency” only); Kristina M. Lybecker & Elisabeth Fowler, Compulsory Licensing in
Canada and Thailand: Comparing Regimes to Ensure Legitimate Use of the WTO Rules,
37 J.L. MED & ETHICS 222 (2009) (omitting any discussion of noncommercial use); Sykes,
supra note 145, at 56.
163.
A Gathering Storm, supra note 91.
164.
Id.
165.
Christopher E. Chalsen & Lawrence T. Welch, Growing Hostility Toward
Intellectual Property? 8, Paper Presented at 1st IPO-JIPA Asian Practice International
Congress (Sept. 14, 2005) (quoting Article 31(b) of TRIPS) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&
ContentID=14899.
166.
Id. (emphasis added).
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negotiation. This omission may reflect the uber-right view that
compulsory licenses should be granted only in emergencies,
regardless of the actual law.
Similarly, Stanford Law Professor Alan Sykes stated that
Article 31 “limits compulsory licensing without prior negotiation
to genuinely extreme circumstances,” but mentions only a
167
He seems to entirely overlook the
“national emergency.”
possibility that a country could issue a compulsory license
without prior negotiation in a situation beyond a national
emergency, and instead tries to characterize what would likely be
a public noncommercial use as a twisted situation of national
emergency. However, he is not alone. A recent article coauthored by a professor of economics asserts that “countries do
have the option to waive the negotiation with the patent holder
in cases of extreme urgency or national emergency,” without
any mention of the possibility of waiver in the case of public
168
noncommercial use. In fact, the article later suggests that
Thailand acted improperly because it “simply announced the
‘public use’ of the patent without discussing the matter with
169
Merck & Co. first.”
Interestingly, Professor Sykes seems to have concern about
waiver of prior negotiation even in his limited circumstances. In
particular, he is skeptical that a developing country should be
able to “unilaterally determine that they are unable to afford
pharmaceuticals at current prices, declare that a ‘national
emergency’ results, and then implement policies that leave
170
patent holders with rents near zero.” This statement may
reflect an uber-right view of patents that leads him to assume a
contorted interpretation of what constitutes a national
emergency and overlook that TRIPS plainly permits public
noncommercial use without prior negotiation. Alternatively,
perhaps the idea that any patent could be licensed for public
noncommercial use is so terrifying that framing the issue as a
clearly improper emergency seems more appropriate—even if
this happens at an unconscious level. Similarly, an article coauthored by Professor Lybecker suggests that while “it may be
reasonable to utilize compulsory licensing for national
emergencies . . . . there is a need to distinguish legitimate
171
compulsory licensing regimes from abusive ones.” Although
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Sykes, supra note 145, at 56.
Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, at 224.
Id. at 228.
Sykes, supra note 145, at 56.
Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, at 225 (emphasis added).
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“abusive” compulsory licenses are not defined, there is a
suggestion that compulsory licenses can only be supported to
“address a humanitarian crisis,” further suggesting that there
should be some urgent or emergency situation to justify a
172
compulsory license.
2. Mythical Exclusion of Some Countries. Although
discussion of the perceived lack of emergency in Thailand seems
to overshadow most other topics, there are a couple of other areas
where the influence of the uber-right perspective seems to result
in new requirements not within the literal text of TRIPS. Two
examples exist with respect to which countries may qualify to use
compulsory licensing. As noted above, TRIPS permits any
member state to issue a compulsory license. Nonetheless, there
have been suggestions that licenses be denied to middle-income
countries, or militarily governed countries. For example, an
article in an academic publication recently asserted that
173
compulsory licensing “is intended . . . for developing countries.”
There is no citation to TRIPS for this assertion—nor can there be
174
because TRIPS is not so limited.
Critics repeatedly suggest that Thailand should not have
been permitted to issue compulsory licenses because it is a
175
middle-income country. However, nowhere in TRIPS Article 31
is there a limitation on compulsory licenses based on the
economic status of the country. Many of the criticisms are also
tied to the general premise that middle-income countries can
afford to pay full price. This factual premise may be disputed,
considering at least 25% of the Thai population lives on less than
176
$2 per day. More importantly, there is nothing in TRIPS that
requires a country to demonstrate financial incapacity, or to be
below a certain income level before being able to utilize
compulsory licenses. Any suggestion otherwise may reflect an
uber-right perspective that reads in additional limitations to
justify the position that exceptions such as compulsory licenses
must be limited.

172.
Id. (emphasis added). The article further asserts that humanitarian crises are
more supportable than the “industrial policy objective” of a country. Id. However, what
would constitute an illegitimate policy objective is not stated.
173.
Id. at 223.
174.
Id. at 223 & n.5 (implying that TRIPS intended for compulsory licensing to be
used in developing countries but failing to cite any section of TRIPS for support).
175.
E.g., Cass, supra note 4; Kazmin & Jack, supra note 45.
176.
See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, at 238
(2007), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf.
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Another issue that is sometimes raised with respect to
Thailand is that the licenses were imposed by a military-installed
government, as if this were a relevant factor. However, just as
with the economic status of a country, the type of government is
not a relevant issue under TRIPS with respect to issuing a
compulsory license. There is nothing under the terms of TRIPS
Article 31 referring to the type of government entitled to use a
compulsory license, let alone any suggestion that use of licenses
by a military-based government should be subject to increased
177
scrutiny.
C. Non-issues Raised Versus Real Issues in Need of Resolution
This section focuses yet again on the impact of patent
perspectives on compulsory licenses, but from a different angle.
Whereas the prior section provided examples of the power of
perspectives in distorting clear language of TRIPS, this section
highlights a more subtle, yet nonetheless significant impact of
perspectives. In particular, this section focuses on the fact that
perspectives may result in the propagation of non-issues under
TRIPS that mask fundamental questions about TRIPS terms
that are in actual need of interpretation. The competing
perspectives are posited as responsible for the misplaced
discussion because each perspective may yield differing, yet valid
interpretations. This section attempts to pair the non-issues
raised with the real issues under TRIPS jurisprudence that in
fact need attention.
1. No Emergency Versus Public Noncommercial Use: Is
There an Emergency or an Epidemic? Critics have spent a great
deal of time addressing the issue of whether there is an
appropriate epidemic that would justify any of Thailand’s
178
licenses. Some have criticized Thailand’s licenses as improper
for lack of any public emergency regarding AIDS, let alone heart
179
disease or cancer. Moreover, the comments seem to suggest
that what constitutes an emergency should be qualified in
contrast to the plain language of the Doha Public Health
177.
In fact, other provisions of Article 31 suggest that discretion is given to the
national authority without regard to how it is organized. For example, the decision of
what constitutes permissible subject matter is one that is within the province of the
national government. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31.
178.
See, e.g., Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, at 233; Cass, supra note 4 (stating
that Thailand is a “relatively developed nation facing no epidemic”).
179.
See, e.g. Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, at 233 (disputing claim of adequate
emergency where only 300,000 patients are inflicted with heart disease and only 15,000
with lung and liver cancer).
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Declaration, which states that each nation is entitled to decide
180
what constitutes a national emergency, including HIV.
A great deal of the comments criticizing Thailand’s lack of
an emergency would seem relevant to an uber-right view that
wants to limit exceptions. In particular, perhaps an uber-right
view is willing to permit compulsory licenses in the case of an
emergency, but not for public noncommercial use, such that all
the arguments are framed within the emergency context.
Moreover, the attempt to further limit what counts as an
emergency when the Doha Public Health Declaration reserves
this issue for the national authorities also suggests the imprint of
the uber-right view that exceptions be very limited.
The relevant TRIPS issue that may be masked by the
discussion of whether there is an adequate emergency is what
constitutes “public noncommercial use.” As noted above, this is
one of several grounds upon which a nation may issue a
compulsory license without prior negotiation with the patent
owner. Thailand has assumed that it clearly qualifies. Although a
few critics have suggested that only a cynical distortion of TRIPS
would possibly encompass Thailand’s actions, there has been
relatively little discussion of this term. However, all of Thailand’s
181
licenses were issued on this ground.
It may be more appealing to paint Thailand’s actions as
failing to meet the requirement of an emergency—even if this is
not an issue—rather than address the more difficult question of
182
what constitutes public noncommercial use. However, some of
the comments that attempt to fit criticism concerning the license
of Plavix as an inappropriate emergency could be easily replaced
by criticism against an overbroad interpretation of public
noncommercial use. For example, the Plavix license has been
sharply criticized as the first step on a slippery slope towards
licensing any and all patents if heart disease were considered an
183
emergency. However, it would seem equally apropos for the
pharmaceutical industry to say that if public noncommercial use

180.
Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(c) (emphasis added).
181.
EFAVIRENZ LICENSE, supra note 50, at 38–39; KALETRA LICENSE, supra note 50,
at 41–42; PLAVIX LICENSE, supra note 50, at 44–45.
182.
This is a challenging question under TRIPS because what uses are considered
noncommercial, as well as for the benefit of the public, have been thorny questions in
national laws with respect to what should be a legitimate research exception in patent
law, as well as a legitimate fair use in copyright law. Even if a TRIPS interpretation
focused more on dictionary definitions, rather than the vagaries of these terms under
national law, there is likely still much room for discussion concerning what constitutes a
public noncommercial use.
183.
Cass, supra note 104.
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were a permissible ground for compulsory license, it would be a
slippery slope towards licensing any and all patents. Perhaps the
public noncommercial use is the true slippery slope that terrifies
patent owners such that they have displaced their concerns on
the emergency criteria instead.
There are a few critical articles that address the question of
what constitutes public noncommercial use, but they generally
take a very dismissive and conclusive approach. For example,
some state that because the licenses were issued to a government
agency that is for-profit, the licenses presumably must be for
184
profit. Others assert that for Thailand to assert the application
of public noncommercial use would be simply “taking advantage
185
of vague language.” However, it is unclear whether the term
“public noncommercial use” is really any more vague than other
terms that lack definition in TRIPS; after all, when other terms
are undefined, countries have been given freedom to define these
terms themselves. In addition, to the extent that this term
should have a uniform meaning, these dismissive comments fail
to foster a productive conversation about the scope of public
noncommercial use. While the existing comments about how
heart disease is not an adequate emergency to justify a
compulsory license of Plavix can be easily dismissed as legally
irrelevant, there is an outstanding issue of whether Thailand or
any other country could broadly license any and all drug patents
without any negotiation with the patent owner based on the
ground of public noncommercial use.
2. No
Research/Innovation
Versus
Adequate
Remuneration. There is a disproportionate amount of
commentary suggesting that the compulsory licenses are wrong
or improperly issued because they will negatively impact
research, rather than discussion of whether the licenses comply
with TRIPS requirements. Out of the many articles criticizing
the Thai licenses, almost none mention the amount of
remuneration, whereas most suggest that the licenses would
186
negatively impede innovation. While innovation is relevant,
184.
See id. (stating that public noncommercial use “comprehends uses such as
public research programs, not monopoly provision by a for-profit government agency”);
Christopher Horner, Thailand Stealing out of WTO? WASH. TIMES, May 17, 2007, at 1
(presuming that the GPO will use the licenses for commercial sale based on its past
work with private companies); see also Editorial, Good Medicine for Thailand, WALL ST.
J. ASIA, May 29, 2008, at 13 (suggesting that the GPO is in competition with the
pharmaceutical industry, such that a license to the GPO cannot be for noncommercial
use).
185.
Editorial, The Thai Flu, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, at A14.
186.
E.g., Aide Mémoire, supra note 52 (“Switzerland is convinced that patents are
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TRIPS does actually address this issue by mandating that the
187
patent owner be provided “adequate remuneration.” This term
is not defined under TRIPS. However, as some scholars have
noted, if the remuneration is truly adequate, the pipeline of new
drugs would not suffer. Moreover, in addition to the uneven
discussion of adequate remuneration, none of the patent owners
brought a legal challenge to the amount of remuneration
provided by Thailand, although that avenue was available to
them.
The uber-right may believe that compulsory licenses are
inherently inconsistent with the principle of adequate
remuneration, such that it is not worth even discussing that
term. In the few instances where remuneration is mentioned, it
seems clear that an uber-right perspective would deem any
amount below the usual market value to be inadequate. For
example, one editorial states that reasonable royalties “almost
always leave the rights holder with far less than a reasonable
economic return,” thus suggesting that any compulsory license
188
would be unacceptable. No alternative amount of remuneration

part of the solution to long term access to innovative medicines in Thailand.”); Ashley M.
Heher, Abbott, Thailand Face off in AIDS Drug Patent Stalemate, AEGIS NEWS, June 6,
2007, http://www.aegis.com/news/ap/2007/AP070616.html (quoting PhRMA president as
stating that Thailand’s “misguided focus” would have “long-term cost, potentially
limiting important incentives”); Kristina M. Lybecker, Op-Ed., Compulsory Drug
Licensing Disastrous, DENVERPOST.COM, Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.denverpost.com/
guestcommentary/ci_8616902 (suggesting that compulsory licenses will negatively impact
innovation in the area of neglected diseases); Sally Pipes, Sanction Nations Selling
Generic Versions of Drugs?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 13A (suggesting that
Thailand’s action sets a “dangerous precedent that will stifle medical innovation and
endanger the health of millions”). This is even true of articles published in academic
journals. One of the most recent articles discussing the Thai situation repeats the
pharmaceutical perspective that compulsory licenses harm innovation, and while
generally critical of the Thai licenses, this article fails to discuss whether the licenses
provide inadequate remuneration. See Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, passim. Most
articles suggest that innovation in general will be crippled if compulsory licenses occur,
although some also suggest that compulsory licenses will harm innovation for neglected
diseases that predominantly impact poor countries. For example, one article generally
sympathetic to the uber-right noted that the pharmaceutical industry argument that
compulsory licenses reduce incentives for research of neglected diseases is weakened by
the lack of current research, but that it was nonetheless a viable argument because “any
obstacle to research on neglected diseases should be removed to increase the likelihood of
innovation in these areas.” Id. at 232. Similarly, some have suggested that stricter
criteria for patentability will necessarily discourage innovation into neglected diseases.
See Roger Bate, India and the Drug Patent Wars, HEALTH POL’Y OUTLOOK, Feb. 2007, at
4, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070207_200702HPOg.pdf (suggesting that if Novartis is
denied a patent for its beta crystal version of Glivec, it will lack incentive to develop drugs
to address diseases unique to the Indian market, such as dengue fever, for which Novartis
is the leader in the search for a cure).
187.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(h).
188.
Cass, supra note 93.
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is proposed; rather, the only alternative discussed is simply not
189
imposing a license.
Despite the lack of discussion of adequate remuneration thus
far, this could be a very important issue. After all, if a
compulsory license could be imposed with a remuneration
amount deemed adequate to patent owners, compulsory licenses
190
would theoretically lose a major objection. Indeed, based on
that theory, some academics have suggested that compulsory
licenses ensure that patent owners get appropriate value and
that it is a mere myth that compulsory licenses should result in
191
cost-savings. If that were the case, a compulsory license would
be of little value to countries attempting to use “TRIPS
flexibilities” to enhance access to medicine as the Doha Public
Health Declaration suggests is possible.
3. Factual Dispute on Prior Negotiation Versus Defining
Prior Negotiation. Another non-issue is the seemingly factual
question of whether Thailand negotiated with patent owners
before issuing compulsory licenses. While this may seem to be a
relevant factual dispute with a single correct answer, the real
problem is that the “facts” seen are a function of how differing
patent perspectives define “prior negotiation,” yet another
important, but undefined, term under TRIPS. Whereas Thailand
asserts that it is not required to negotiate with patent owners
prior to exercising a compulsory license for public noncommercial
192
use, but in fact did attempt to negotiate for years, critics of its
licenses generally contend that Thailand failed to negotiate such
193
that patent owners were shocked to find out about the licenses.
The prior negotiation controversy highlights the impact of
patent perspectives on undefined TRIPS terms. The privilege
189.
See Bate & Boateng, supra note 128, at 7 (arguing that prices set by drug
companies are required for continued research and development, such that compulsory
licenses constitute theft); Bate, Thailand and the Drug Patent Wars, supra note 43,
passim (suggesting that Thailand’s licenses were inconsistent with TRIPS because there
was no emergency but failing to address the issue of remuneration); Cass, supra note 4
(arguing that compulsory licenses are only permitted under “extraordinary
circumstances” and suggesting that Thailand failed to comply without mentioning any
specific violation, let alone any discussion of what amount of remuneration would be
adequate).
190.
There may still be fears of parallel imports, although some academics have
suggested that the fears are disproportionate to actual evidence. E.g., Kevin Outterson,
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription
Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 261–62 & n.304 (2005).
191.
E.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha,
42 GA. L. REV. 131, 155–56 (2007).
192.
See TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 3–6.
193.
See, e.g., Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, at 228; Bale, supra note 110.
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view of patents may view any negotiation as prior negotiation,
even if conducted years before the compulsory license is granted.
After all, there was some negotiation and it was prior to the
license. If patents are viewed as a privilege, the extent of
negotiation would not seem important, nor would giving notice to
the patent owner of an imminent imposition of a compulsory
license be important because a patent is only a privilege, and not
a right. However, judging from the response of patent owners
that they were shocked that the licenses were imposed with no
negotiation at all, it seems that an uber-right view may take a
different view of what constitutes prior negotiation. Perhaps the
uber-right requires prior negotiation to occur immediately before
the license is imposed and perhaps with explicit mention of an
impending license, rather than general negotiations years in
advance of a license.
The importance of prior negotiation to the uber-right may
have resulted in at least one misstatement of the TRIPS rule.
TRIPS plainly provides an exception to prior negotiation in the
case of an emergency, public urgency, as well as public
194
noncommercial use. Nonetheless, Professor Froehner alleged
that “[e]ven in a legitimate emergency . . . the owner of the IP
rights that are confiscated is entitled under WTO rules to
195
consultation before the decision is made.” While this statement
is inaccurate as to the actual law, it may accurately reflect what
the uber-right views as essential, such that it becomes their
reality.
4. Factual Dispute of Frequency of Compulsory Licenses.
The final non-issue shows some exaggeration by both the uber196
right, as well as the privilege views. In particular, whereas the
privilege perspective asserts that compulsory licenses occur

194.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b) (“This requirement [of prior negotiation with the
patent owner] may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.”).
195.
Froehner, supra note 43, at 5.
196.
Although this is the final “non-issue” discussed in this article, there are other
non-issues that could be addressed. For example, as shown in the contrasting narratives,
the uber-right seems to second-guess whether Thailand is acting in the interest of public
health, although this is not technically required by TRIPS. See supra text accompanying
notes 107–08 (noting the suspicions raised by Thailand’s having issued the compulsory
licenses after an increase in the defense budget and a decrease in the health care budget);
see also Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, at 228 (suggesting that Thailand’s motivation
to protect public health is suspect). This could be another situation where the uber-right
would prefer compulsory licenses to be limited to health crises, such that they may seize
any opportunity to suggest that the licensor country does not have a legitimate health
interest.
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197

frequently in a variety of countries, the uber-right perspective
198
asserts that compulsory licenses are rare. This seems like
another situation where there must be only one correct answer.
However, the differing perspectives may once again fill
ambiguities under TRIPS. The dispute here focuses not only on
how often compulsory licenses are issued, but on what
constitutes a compulsory license in the first place. However, that
is actually a red herring because TRIPS does not even use the
term compulsory license. Rather, TRIPS refers to uses not
199
authorized by the patent owner. This term is considered to
encompass not only the type of compulsory license issued by
Thailand, but also “government use” of patents commonly
practiced by the United States whereby use of patented
inventions by government contractors are subject only to
remuneration, but never injunctions.
In this case, although how frequently compulsory licenses
are issued may on its face seem pertinent to whether they should
be permitted or granted, that is a non-issue in the context of
what is permissible under TRIPS. Granted, frequency of
compulsory licenses may seem like a relevant policy
consideration, but to the extent that TRIPS states the rule of law,
that would seem the relevant metric. So, what does each side
have to gain by focusing on this non-issue?
One hypothesis for the posturing concerning what counts as
compulsory licensing and how frequently it occurs is that the
accusations are intended to mask the other issues. In particular,
if the uber-right, for example, can show that the privilege view on
the number of compulsory licenses granted is an exaggeration,
they can perhaps attempt to suggest that all statements
concerning the privilege view are suspect. On the other hand, the
privilege view may be attempting to indirectly tackle the nonissue of whether compulsory licenses impact innovation by
suggesting they occur frequently. This could be an admission by
the privilege view that policy is relevant on some level beyond
what is permitted under TRIPS.

197.
Offenheiser, supra note 85 (“The intellectual property safeguards that Thailand
‘exploited’ have been invoked by many countries, not only for medicines but for many
fields of technology. In fact, the United States has been a major user of compulsory
licensing . . . .”); see also LOVE, supra note 84 (discussing global use of compulsory licenses).
198.
E.g., Sidney A. Rosenzweig, The False Connection Between Strong Patent Rights
and Global Inequity: A Response to Professor Stiglitz, PROGRESS ON POINT, March 2009, at
1, 19–20, http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.8patentstiglitz.pdf; Editorial,
supra note 4 (“[N]o serious government has contemplated using compulsory licensing,
even if it’s allowed to do so under WTO rules.”).
199.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31.
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V. EXAMINING THE IMPORTANCE OF PATENT PERSPECTIVES
This Part addresses the importance of the patent perspective
theory. Prior Parts have mostly focused on the relatively narrow,
albeit contentious issue of compulsory licenses of patents. This
Part both anticipates challenges to the general theory, as well as
considers broader implications. For example, this Part considers
implications of the perspective theory for an enhanced narrative
of TRIPS history, as well as a better understanding of future
negotiations in both domestic and global arenas.
A. Anticipating Challenges
The competing patent perspectives theory is important both
because it is real and because it has not been previously
recognized. Like all new theories and observations, challenges
are anticipated. Accordingly, this section attempts to anticipate
and address possible challenges to the competing perspectives
theory set forth above.
1. Fake Phenomena? One potential objection to the
competing views presented here may be that the two poles of
patent perspectives articulated do not accurately represent true
views, or at most, represent mere rhetoric. However, the
intensity of debates concerning compulsory licenses, including
name-calling and full page advertisements to support differing
positions, suggests that there is in fact something real to
200
discuss. Moreover, even if some statements are rhetoric, when
similar positions are evidenced by news media and academics, it
seems less likely that they are all engaged in simple posturing.
Also, patent perspectives may be the source of rhetoric because
rhetoric does not arise in a vacuum.
In addition, although compulsory licenses have been used as
a case study to showcase patent perspectives, they are not the
only illustration of the role of perspectives in viewing patents.
200.
Full page advertisements criticizing Thailand’s actions were taken out by a
group called USA for Innovation in the Wall Street Journal and in the Thai media. See,
e.g., The USA for Innovation Story, http://www.2bangkok.com/07/news07apr.shtml (last
visited Oct. 22, 2009); Press Release, USA for Innovation, USA for Innovation Announces
Advertising Campaign in Thailand (May 10, 2007), http://www.thaipr.net/nc/
readnews.aspx?newsid=2FF823462E1DE002F0DBA754EE0ABCC3. In addition, there
were competing ads that supported Thailand’s actions. See, e.g., Macan-Markar, supra
note 81 (highlighting efforts by AIDS activists in support of Thailand’s decision); National
AIDS Treatment Advocacy Project, US Website Attacks Thai Government’s Breaking of
AIDS/HIV Drug Patents (May 15, 2007), http://www.natap.org/2007/newsUpdates/
052407_05.htm (documenting specific government and international health organization
responses).
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Another example lies in India’s unique patent laws that limit the
scope of patentability for compounds that are similar to existing
compounds; in such cases, India requires that there be increased
201
efficacy. India’s narrow approach to patentability is consistent
with a view of patents as privilege; indeed, the explanation given
for this provision is a desire to foster true innovation, and avoid a
popular pharmaceutical practice of “evergreening” patents with
202
very small, yet patentable modifications. It is also consistent
with India’s recent history of denying patents on all
pharmaceutical products in the interest of promoting access to
drugs, until it was required to modify its laws to comply with
203
TRIPS. However, to patent owners and those who subscribe to
the uber-right view, India’s law can be seen as stealing from
204
innovators and casting a death knell on innovation.
This is not to suggest that the competing perspectives
provide the only reason for discord. There are also other
legitimate issues that may be at play, including, but not limited
to, the fear that compulsory licenses will lead to other problems
for patent profits even in countries where no such licenses issue.
This could happen, for example, because low-cost drugs made
under compulsory license could become parallel imports in
another country where they undercut the price of the patent
owner. Alternatively, the price of drugs made under a compulsory
license may result in pressure to reduce prices in other markets
either because some nations use reference pricing based on what
other countries pay, or because of public pressure to offer

201.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3(d).
202.
See, e.g., Adarsh Ramanujan & Rajarshi Sen, Pruning the Evergreen Tree:
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act 1970, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 135, 137 (2009).
203.
The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970, § 5 (providing that for
inventions in the area of food, medicine, drugs, or chemical substances, only patents on
methods or processes of manufacture could be obtained); see also Shamnad Basheer,
India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, 1 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 15,
17–19, 34 (2005) (explaining the rationale for prior patent law and the ability of the
amended laws to limit patents on incremental pharmaceutical innovations). For an
extensive history on India’s patent law, see Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The
Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (2007).
204.
See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, Taking TRIPS to India—Novartis, Patent Law, and
Access to Medicine, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 541, 541 (2007) (“According to Novartis, there
is ‘no faster way to kill access to the latest life-saving drugs for people in India than to
avoid offering patent protection.’”); Press Release, Int’l Fed’n of Pharm. Mfrs. & Assocs.,
Chennai Court Ruling: India’s Innovative Potential Continues to Be Stifled by Its Poor
Patent Law (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.ifpma.org/News/NewsReleaseDetail.aspx?nID=
7860 (noting that the clause “severely restricts innovation” and that “India has the
potential to be a global leader in biomedical R&D, but its current patent legislation
condemns it to lag behind”).
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discounted prices. However, the existence of these other factors
does not mean that perspectives do not exist.
2. All About Property. Another possible objection to the
competing views presented is that they simply reflect different
views of property—namely, that the observations are not unique
to patent law. It is indeed possible that there are differing views
on personal ownership of property. However, that might actually
suggest that the competing perspectives have broader
application. In addition, there should be some similarity between
patents and other property in general because by law, patents
205
are often considered property. On the other hand, patents also
have unique characteristics that make them distinguishable from
real and personal property. One very important issue is that
patents can impede access to medicine—something that real and
personal property rights normally do not do. In addition, while
matters of life and death may occasionally be at issue with real
property—for example, if passage through real property was
necessary in the case of an emergency—there tends to be less
controversy than when exceptions are made to patent rights. Part
of this may be due to the fact that patents routinely impede access
to medicine whereas real property does not routinely stand in the
way of health and safety. Some may suggest that patents are a
bargain struck by society—that the limited access to patents
during the patent term is a proper trade for encouraging more
innovation. However, the privilege perspective would seem to
expect additional exceptions to patent rights despite this bargain.
Alternatively, perhaps controversy over any property,
whether real or intellectual, is more a function of a disconnect
between expected and actual rights. In particular, to the extent
that compulsory licenses are not expected, patent owners may be
rightfully surprised about their rights being taken away.
Similarly, when the rights of private property are seemingly
disturbed, as happened when the U.S. Supreme Court permitted
a broad reading of what property could be taken, rights holders
206
may react strongly. Although there may be a similar reaction in
both cases, they can also each be alternatively characterized as a
disagreement between rights (whether property or patent) as an
uber-right, or as a privilege, subject to exception.

205.
E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (declaring that “patents shall have the attributes of
personal property”).
206.
See David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing the public reaction to Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469 (2005)).
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In addition, even if there are similarities between real and
intellectual property, disputes concerning patents and
implications of differing privileges may be more important
because of some distinctions between patents versus real
property. One important difference is that the legal boundaries of
real property are generally much clearer than with patent rights.
Unlike the clear boundaries of real property, the legal boundaries
207
of patents are notoriously unclear unless and until litigated.
This lack of clarity might be at least partially responsible for
patent owners craving more certainty in other areas, such as
limiting exceptions to patent rights.
In addition, there is no international agreement analogous to
TRIPS that attempts to dictate how all nations respect property
rights. Accordingly, it may be easier for nations to have different
views of property rights when each sovereign nation may make
its own decision. Moreover, there are important differences
between patents versus real property in that they each raise
distinct issues. Although rights in patents and real property are
both granted under national law, real property typically has no
international analogs, whereas a patent owner often has similar
patents in a number of countries. Accordingly, the issue of
differing perspectives on real property would not be a global issue
because real property does not as easily cross borders. This does
not mean that there may not be conflict concerning property
rights within a nation. However, the conflicts within a nation
may be less severe given that there is more likely to be a shared
culture. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, conflicting perspectives
on patents raise special concern because conflicts over real
property entitlements are unlikely to be the same death knell as
exclusion from patented drugs.
3. Wishful Thinking. The view that compulsory licenses
should be limited to declared national emergencies could be
based on an assumption that TRIPS reflects what was proposed
or desired. After all, TRIPS was the brainchild of U.S. companies
seeking to protect their global interest in intellectual property,
and most agree that the final language in TRIPS often reflects
208
the desires of developed countries such as the United States. In
207.
See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 46–68 (2008).
208.
See, e.g., Duncan Matthews, Is History Repeating Itself? The Outcome of
Negotiations on Access to Medicines, the HIV/AIDS Pandemic and Intellectual Property
Rights in the World Trade Organization, LAW SOC. JUSTICE & GLOBAL DEV., June 4, 2004,
at 4, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2004_1/matthews (stating that the
final version of TRIPS “was perceived to closely reflect the demands of developed
countries and their industries”).
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the context of compulsory licenses, the United States did suggest
209
that licenses should be limited to these two situations. In
addition, the Brussels draft on compulsory licensing—the last
draft before the final text of TRIPS was concluded—does not
include public noncommercial use amongst the categories of
situations under which prior negotiation with the patent owner
may be waived; although there is a separate paragraph
suggesting that public noncommercial use by the government, or
authorized by the government, need not comply with any of the
210
procedural requirements. And, as noted by another scholar, the
U.S. government has continued to represent its proposed view as
211
to what TRIPS states. In addition, while TRIPS places no
restrictions on which countries can use compulsory licenses,
there is a perpetual belief by the uber-right that this should be
212
the case. That seems clear not only from criticisms of Thailand,
but also from other discussions about solutions to providing poor
countries with access to medicine.
The presumption that TRIPS contains all provisions
originally desired may be further complicated by the fact that in
a number of international agreements a member can claim a
breach if expected benefits are not conferred, even if those
benefits are not expressly stated as a requirement. Under the
GATT, which has been superseded by the WTO, a member can
bring a nonviolation complaint when the negotiated balance of
concessions is upset by application of a measure, even if the
measure is not inconsistent with the literal text of the
213
agreement. However, in the area of TRIPS, parties agreed to
place an initial moratorium on nonviolation complaints, which
214
In addition, it has been stated that
has yet to be lifted.
209.
See Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from the United States art. 27,
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 (May 11, 1990).
210.
Brussels Draft of the TRIPS Agreement subsecs. (b), (o), reprinted in GERVAIS,
supra note 23, at 385–87.
211.
See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 320 (2001).
212.
See, e.g., Head, supra note 1 (“The drug companies have always assumed that
the [TRIPS] exception would only be used for a dire emergency, like HIV/Aids or avian
flu.” (emphasis added)).
213.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIII.1(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
214.
TRIPS initially provided a moratorium on such disputes; the 2005 WTO
Ministerial Convention (Hong Kong) extended the moratorium. TRIPS, supra note 2, art.
64(2) (noting a five year moratorium on nonviolation complaints); World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 11.1, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov.
20, 2001) (stating that members shall not initiate such complaints while the TRIPS
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“virtually all the experts” believe that such types of claims should
215
not apply to TRIPS disputes.
4. Genuine Confusion. An alternative explanation to patent
perspectives may be that they simply reflect real confusion. Even
among intellectual property scholars—including those familiar
with the patent provisions of TRIPS—there is frequently an
assumption that an emergency is required, or at least that only
an emergency or other situation of extreme urgency could provide
216
the grounds for waiving prior negotiation. While there may
indeed be some legitimate confusion, that confusion could be
stoked by those with an uber-right view propagated by the
217
media.
Confusion regarding compulsory licenses is exacerbated by
the fact that the requirements of compulsory licenses relevant to
Thailand are not the ones that have been most discussed in the
popular press, as well as in scholarly literature. Rather, what
may be exacerbating the confusion is a complicated procedure for
waiver of one of the usual TRIPS requirements not at issue in the
Thai licenses—that compulsory licenses be predominantly for

Council continues to study the issue); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration
of 18 December 2005, ¶ 45, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (Dec. 22, 2005) (noting a continued
moratorium on nonviolation complaints while the TRIPS Council continues to study the
issue); see also GERVAIS, supra note 23, at 115–18 (explaining nonviolation complaints).
215.
Haochen Sun, TRIPS and Non-violation Complaints: From a Public Health
Perspective 5 (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/
Sun-TRIPS.pdf.
216.
For example, a recent article discussing the history of TRIPS characterizes
Article 31 as requiring prior negotiation except “in the event of a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency,” without any mention of public noncommercial
use. Matthews, supra note 208, at 5. Rather, the article states that “on the face of it,
compulsory licenses could be granted by a developing country without prior negotiation
with the holder of rights to key pharmaceutical patents in the case of a public health crisis
of epidemic proportions.” Id. (emphasis added).
217.
Media reports read by the public, including academics, frequently reflect an
uber-right perspective and seem to give it credence. For example, Ron Cass has written a
number of editorials critical of Thailand’s licenses in the Wall Street Journal. E.g., Cass,
supra note 93. His editorials definitely fall within the uber-right mold, but are given a
sense of legitimacy because he is often referred to as former Dean and Professor of Boston
University, as well as associated with the authoritative sounding “Center for the Rule of
Law,” which is in fact a conservative group. Cass, supra note 4. His views—or at least, his
views together with similar views in the Wall Street Journal—may be influential even
among those would not necessarily subscribe to an uber-right view. Although I have not
done a full-fledged empirical study, in presenting earlier iterations of this paper, I have
been surprised by the number of legal academics who questioned whether Thailand’s
actions could be proper because the Wall Street Journal repeatedly criticized its actions.
Granted, most who asked this question did not specialize in the field of international
patent law, but I was still surprised that legal academics would necessarily assume that a
claim in the Wall Street Journal that those sympathetic to Thailand were necessarily
“activists” would have garnered more skepticism.
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domestic use. In 2001, member states came to the unanimous
consensus that poor countries with inadequate manufacturing
capacities could not realistically use compulsory licenses under
TRIPS because even if they issued such a license, they had no
218
ability to make cheap drugs because of lack of infrastructure.
Moreover, countries with infrastructure to make generic drugs
could not necessarily make and ship those drugs under a
compulsory license because TRIPS required licenses to be limited
219
to predominantly domestic use. For several years there was a
global discussion concerning how to address this issue until the
WTO announced a complicated procedure to permit waiver of the
220
domestic use requirement in 2003. This proposal stirred further
debate, culminating in 2005 with proposed Article 31bis, which is
essentially the identical waiver provision proposed as a formal
221
amendment to TRIPS. This waiver provision contains a number
of limitations that seem to have been incorporated into the uberright view of compulsory licenses in general, even though the
procedure is only applicable to compulsory licenses issued to
supply countries without adequate manufacturing capacities. For
example, Article 31bis is stated to always apply to any leastdeveloped member country, perhaps giving credibility to the
assumptions of some that all compulsory licenses should be
222
limited to such countries. In addition, a number of countries
agreed to only use the procedure in case of national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency, perhaps giving rise to
223
confusion about whether an emergency is required. Also, the
confusion about whether only patents for some subject matter

218.
See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 6.
219.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(f); see also Matthews, supra note 208, at 5
(discussing the consequences of the domestic use limitation for those countries with
pharmaceutical industries incapable of local production).
220.
2003 General Council Decision, supra note 13 (detailing the requirements of
prospective exporter and importer countries seeking a waiver of the domestic use
limitation, and their respective obligations when acting under such a waiver).
221.
World Trade Organization, Decision of the General Council of 6 December 2005,
Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005).
222.
Id. at 4 (defining “eligible importing member”). Other countries may also use the
provision if they have inadequate manufacturing capacity to meet their needs in a given
circumstance beyond that controlled by the patent owner. Id. at 7.
223.
Certain members agreed to use the system as importers only, pending their
accession to the European Union. General Council Chairperson’s Statement, Excerpt from
the Minutes of the General Council Meeting 30 August 2003 (Paragraph n°29),
WT/GC/M/82 (Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/TRIPS_e/
gc_stat_30aug03_e.htm. Other members that would only use the system in the case of an
emergency include Hong Kong, China, Korea, and Mexico. Id. Some other countries, such
as the United States, Switzerland, Canada, and Japan, promised not to use the procedure
at all. Id.
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may be licensed could also derive from discussion of whether the
waiver provision was limited to the conditions listed in the
original Doha Declaration, such as HIV and malaria. The waiver
itself does not explicitly state that it is limited to certain
224
diseases, but some have nonetheless made that contention.
B. Next Steps
Although this Article has focused primarily on documenting
how perspectives can have a dramatic impact on how a single
provision of TRIPS is viewed, the existence of perspectives has
additional support and implications. This section aims to use the
perspectives to provide a richer understanding through two
avenues. First, this section provides further evidence of the
implication of perspectives for the history of TRIPS as well as
current conflicts. Second, this section places the perspectives
theory posited here in the broader context of social science
research. Finally, this section provides some thoughts about
possible implications, as well as points for further research.
1.

Additional Illustrations of Perspectives in Action.

a. TRIPS Revisited—Papering over Perspectives. Most
agree that the conclusion of TRIPS was considered a major and
surprising accomplishment given that many countries had been
225
opposed to a global regime of intellectual property rights.
Scholars have suggested a number of theories thus far for why
agreement was reached on TRIPS. A common view is that
because TRIPS was a package deal, developing countries
willingly bargained away sovereignty over patent (and other
intellectual property) rights in exchange for broader access to
226
markets. Others suggest that while TRIPS can be viewed as a
contract, it is more a contract of adhesion that developing
227
countries had little choice to sign. Still others suggest that the
224.
The United States, in particular, has suggested that the list of diseases stated in
Doha is exclusive, rather than illustrative. See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying
text.
225.
See generally WATAL, supra note 211, at 22–41 (documenting the negotiating
process of TRIPS).
226.
See, e.g., Arie Reich, The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 321, 362 (2004).
227.
E.g., PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM 141 (2002)
(“The inequalities of resources and expertise, not to mention US unilateralism on
intellectual property, would make it easy for anyone wishing to do so to depict TRIPS as
an unconscionable bargain.”); Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, the Progress of
Rights: Human Rights to Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAW & POL’Y 315, 334
(1996) (“[T]he TRIPS Agreement accomplishes, through the potential threat of economic
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conclusion of TRIPS was aided by its minimal framework and
228
many undefined terms. What the perspectives focus adds is
that the supposed consensus was based on papering over
competing perspectives; each country could believe that its goals
were met under TRIPS if the language was broad enough to
reflect competing perspectives.
The entire TRIPS framework can be seen as consistent with
the existence of competing perspectives. Many key terms in
TRIPS are undefined, such as what constitutes an “invention,” as
well as what inventions are sufficiently “new” that they must be
229
patentable. The traditional view is that the lack of definitions
leaves countries “flexibility” to define these terms as they see
230
fit.
The perspectives approach supplements this view by
explaining why TRIPS was originally seen as compatible with all
perspectives, though now subject to conflict. For example, if the
term “invention” is undefined, the uber-right may assume that
TRIPS requires a broad scope of subject matter to count as
invention whereas a privilege view may assume something much
narrower. These different views can coexist until a country
implements a law that illustrates the discord. One recent
example would be India’s patent law requiring increased efficacy
as a prerequisite for patenting a compound similar to a
231
preexisting compound. While this seems reasonable under the
privilege view, it is alternatively viewed as unprecedented and
improper by the uber-right because it deviates from traditional
232
patent norms.
ostracism, what could not be accomplished through negotiations independent of the
international economic framework.”); Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far:
TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 681, 724–38 (2006).
228.
See, e.g., WATAL, supra note 211, at 7 (contending the ambiguous language of
the TRIPS Agreement helped resolve bitter disputes between countries with competing
interests because its terms could be interpreted flexibly depending on the party’s
circumstances).
229.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27.1.
230.
See, e.g., CORREA, supra note 39, at 317; see also Jerome H. Reichman, Securing
Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement After US v India, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 585, 597
(1998) (“US v India confirms that the developing countries are free to adopt their own
laws and policies with respect to all the intellectual property issues that were not
expressly harmonized in the TRIPS standards themselves.”).
231.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3(d)
(declaring that “the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance” is not an invention
within the meaning of law).
232.
The collision of these two views resulted in Novartis’s challenge to the law.
Novartis v. Union of India, 2007 A.I.R. 24759 (Madras H.C.) (India), available at
http://judis.nic.in/chennai/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=11121 (arguing section 3(d) of India’s
amended Patents Act violates Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement declaring all
“inventions” patentable, by narrowing the definition of “invention”). Novartis persisted in
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Competing perspectives are also reflected in ongoing debates
about the meaning of the Doha Public Health Declaration. For
example, the privilege view of patents sees the Declaration as
broadly supporting a health-based approach to patents, citing
Paragraph 4 which states that “the TRIPS Agreement does not
and should not prevent Members from taking measures to
233
protect public health,”
as well as Paragraph 5(b) which
provides that “[e]ach member has the right to grant compulsory
licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which
234
such licenses are granted.” On the other hand, the uber-right
view sees Paragraph 4 as merely hortatory text of no real
meaning—after all, how can patent rights be possibly reconciled
with members taking any measure to protect public health if
patents exist on drugs? In addition, the uber-right view would
point to Paragraph 3, which states that “[w]e recognize that
intellectual property protection is important for the development
235
of new medicines,” as support for narrowly limiting exceptions
to patent rights. Moreover, the uber-right view would interpret
all aspects of Doha from the narrow framework of diseases listed
in Paragraph 1—“HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
236
epidemics.” The privilege view repeatedly emphasizes that this
initial clause more broadly begins by stating, “We recognize the
gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing
and least-developing countries,” and that the listed diseases are
only examples, as indicated by the provision’s use of the word
237
“especially.” In addition, the privilege view would point again to
Paragraph 4 as reflecting a consensus that “we reaffirm the right
of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS

its challenge despite repeated pressure by governments and nongovernmental
organizations to drop the case. See, e.g., Bate, supra note 186, at 3; Tove Iren S.
Gerhardesen, Opposition Gains Support Against Novartis Patent Lawsuit in India,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Feb. 15 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=
535&res=1024 (detailing the global outcry against Novartis’s case against the Indian
government); Letter from Anne Ferreira et al., Members of the European Parliament, to
Daniel Vasella, CEO, Novartis (Feb. 9, 2007), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/
health/c/india/meps02092007.html (predicting that Novartis’s success in the litigation
would compromise India’s ability to export affordable medicines to developing countries);
Letter from Henry Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Daniel
Vasella, CEO, Novartis (Feb. 13, 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/
stories/documents/20070213183300-13686.pdf (expressing concern that Novartis’s
“attempt to influence domestic Indian law could have a severe impact on worldwide access
to medicines”).
233.
Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 4.
234.
Id. ¶ 5(b).
235.
Id. ¶ 4.
236.
Id. ¶ 1.
237.
Id.
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Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose [of protecting
238
public health],” which is given further meaning in Paragraph 5.
The ability of each side to find some language to support its
position may reflect the international reality that to achieve
consensus, language is adopted that is capable of reflecting
multiple viewpoints. However, this simply seems to defer
conflicts to a later date. Indeed, even on one issue that all
countries agreed needed resolution—the futility of compulsory
licensing provisions for countries with inadequate manufacturing
capacity to make their own generic drugs—conflicts abound. On
one level, this should have been a very easy situation because all
agreed that such countries deserved lower-cost drugs, unlike the
controversy over middle-income countries such as Thailand.
However, there was a great deal of haggling over whether there
should be a limit to the types of diseases, as well as applicable
239
countries. Even after the WTO produced a “solution,” in the
form of a proposed amendment to TRIPS, problems remain as the
amendment lacks the necessary two-thirds agreement of
240
members to be enacted.
b. Current Conflicts. Competing perspectives may also help
explain some current conflicts and controversies in the
international landscape. Several scenarios are outlined here that
reflect how perspectives operate beyond the Thailand case study.
First, there are competing perspectives concerning the
interpretation of TRIPS in a new situation—the seizure of drugs
for alleged infringement in a country where they are only intransit to a final destination. Second, the uber-right perspective
may be existent, yet seemingly dormant in some discussions due
to a complex web of international interactions. Third, both
perspectives play a role in domestic and global consideration of
patent law and policy.
238.
Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
239.
See supra note 150 (describing the debate over which diseases constitute public
health emergencies for the purpose of compulsory licenses); see also Abbott & Reichman,
supra note 13, at 936–37 (noting objections to the scope of covered diseases).
240.
Compare World Trade Organization, Members Accepting Amendment of the
TRIPS Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last
visited Nov. 21, 2009) (providing list of 26 member states accepting agreement), with
World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2009) (noting 153 members). The
original deadline for adoption of the amendment was extended from 2007 to 2009, with
another extension likely necessary. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 18
December 2007, WT/L/711 (Dec. 21, 2007). In addition, agreement to the amendment is
not the only hurdle. For example, although the United States consented to the TRIPS
amendment, it has yet to pass any domestic legislation that would enable the United
States to export drugs under compulsory licenses for designated countries.
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The competing perspectives are clearly evident in discussions
surrounding recent in-transit seizures of legally made generic
drugs. In particular, customs officials in Europe have seized a
241
number of drugs pursuant to an EU regulation that permits
242
seizure of goods that infringe a patent. The current debate
243
centers on whether the seizures are consistent with TRIPS.
An uber-right view would say that TRIPS permits seizure of
in-transit patented goods because TRIPS only provides a
minimum level of protection and even seems to contemplate
244
extending protection to this particular instance. This in fact is
245
the position taken by the EU. Similarly, the EU takes the
241.
E.g., Sanjay Suri, Health: EU Blocking Medicines for the Poor, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Oct. 20, 2009, available at http://www.ipseurope.org/news/news.php?key1=200910-21%2018:02:24&key2=1; Kaitlin Mara, Generic Drug Delay Called “Systemic” Problem
at TRIPS Council, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, June 9, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblog/2009/06/09/generic-drug-delay-called-%E2%80%9Csystemic%E2%80%9D-problemat-trips-council; Posting of thiru, NGO Views: World Health Organization (WHO) Voice on
Issue of Medicines in Transit to Developing Countries?, to Knowledge Ecology
International (Mar. 13, 2009, 3:51 EST), http://www.keionline.org/blogs/2009/03/13/whosilence-goods-in-transit; see also Fight over Generic Drug Seizure Takes Centre Stage at
TRIPS Council Meeting, INTELL. PROP. PROGRAMME, Mar. 11, 2009, http://ictsd.net/i/
news/bridgesweekly/42823 [hereinafter Fight over Drug Seizure] (detailing the dispute
over the European Commission’s IP enforcement provisions).
242.
Council Regulation 1383/2003, arts. 1–2, 4, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7, 8–9 (EC)
(authorizing customs authorities to detain goods suspected of violating an intellectual
property right).
243.
In particular, India and Brazil have suggested that the EU action is in violation
of TRIPS and have signaled that they may bring a formal dispute before the WTO. E.g.,
Pallavi Aiyar, No Cure in Sight for India-EU Drug Seizure Controversy, BUS. STANDARD,
Nov. 14, 2009, http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/no-cure-in-sight-for-indiaeu-drug-seizure-controversy/376436; John W. Miller & Geeta Anand, India Prepares EU
Trade Complaint, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Aug. 6, 2009, at 1; Katilin Mara, India May Be
Nearing Dispute Settlement with EU Over Generic Drug Seizures, INTELL. PROP. WATCH,
Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/08/28/india-may-be-nearing-disputesettlement-with-eu-over-generic-drug-seizures. The relevant TRIPS provision requires
member states to adopt procedures to enable custom officials to seize counterfeit
trademark or copyright goods, whereas patents may, but need not be, subject to similar
enforcement. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 51. Also, TRIPS states that “there shall be no
obligation to apply such procedures to . . . goods in transit.” Id. art. 51 n.13. To further
complicate matters, rights holders initiating the border enforcement are required under
TRIPS to show prima facie infringement “under the laws of the country of importation.”
Id. art. 52. But what is the relevant country—is it the in-transit country or the country of
final destination? This ambiguity leaves an opening to be filled by competing perspectives.
In addition, there is an open question concerning whether the seizures violate GATT
Article V concerning freedom of goods. E.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Worst Fears Realized:
The Dutch Confiscation of Medicines Bound from India to Brazil, INTELL. PROP.
PROGRAMME, Mar. 2009, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges/44192.
244.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1 (“Members may . . . implement in their law more
extensive protection than is required by this Agreement . . . .”); see also id. art. 51 n.13
(noting that goods in transit need not be subject to border enforcement, but also not
prohibiting such action).
245.
See Posting of thiru, Intervention by the European Communities (EC) at WTO
General Council on the Seizure of Losartan by Dutch Customs Authorities, to Knowledge
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position that it is the law of the in-transit country, rather than
the final intended destination that applies to whether there is
infringement of the in-transit goods, such that it can deem goods
temporarily in the Netherlands as infringing upon a Dutch
patent. In addition, the uber-right view may be responsible for
conflation of issues by the EU as well as right holders. For
example, in a letter to an Indian generic drug manufacturer,
patent owner Eli Lilly stated that the generic drugs “are not
genuine Eli Lilly products and . . . [a]s such, the Tablets may not
246
be safe or effective.” However, safety and efficacy are issues
beyond the scope of patent law—those issues are solely for a
regulatory agency and, by definition, generic drugs are
considered the bioequivalent of their patented counterpart.
Another example of conflation of issues is a statement by an EU
representative that “countries actually should be grateful to
European customs” for stopping counterfeit medicines because
247
doing so has “most likely . . . saved lives,” even though goods
that infringe patents are not counterfeit—that is a term that
refers to trademark violations—and generic drugs are not unsafe.
The privilege perspective, on the other hand, seems to
underlie a number of interpretations that do not seem justified
by the actual TRIPS text. For example, some have asserted that
in-transit goods cannot infringe if they are legally manufactured
and permissible at the point of final destination. However, they
248
do not cite a specific TRIPS provision for support. In addition,
the privilege perspective is evident in statements that place
undue emphasis on one clause in the Doha Public Health
Declaration that says TRIPS “can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of the right to protect

Ecology International (Feb. 5, 2009, 9:03 EST), http://www.keionline.org/blogs/2009/02/05/
ec-intervention-at-wto (detailing the EC intervention at the WTO General Council
defending the Dutch seizure of medicines en route from India to Brazil).
246.
Letter from Eli Lilly & Co. to Cipla (Dec. 9, 2008), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/eudrugs2009letter3.pdf.
247.
Fight over Drug Seizure, supra note 241.
248.
Intervention by Brazil, WTO General Council Meeting Feb. 3–4, 2008, ¶ 6,
available at http://www.ip-watch.org/files/RemediosIntervencao-do-Brasil-Conselho Geral03 02 2008.doc (asserting that medicines are generic under the law of the market where
they are commercialized based on TRIPS, although not citing any actual TRIPS
provisions); Michael Day, Aid Agencies Condemn Drug Confiscation, 338 BRIT. MED. J.
1002 (2009) (noting that aid agencies assert that under WTO rules, intellectual property
rights only apply at a shipments’ point of origin and destination); John W. Miller & Geeta
Anand, India to Fight EU Drug Delays in WTO Complaint, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2009, at
B4; see also Intervention by Brazil, TRIPS Council Meeting June 8–9, 2009, available at
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/brazil-statement-trips-june09.pdf (asserting that the “TRIPS Agreement does not allow the detention of goods in
transit,” without citing a specific TRIPS provision that directly supports this proposition).
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public health” to suggest that any action inconsistent with public
health—such as seizure of in-transit drugs—is improper. While
this quote is accurate, this statement does not provide an
affirmative right—unlike the provisions of TRIPS at issue.
Moreover, the cited provision omits the broader context of the
quote, which first states that members “reiterat[e] our
commitment to the TRIPS agreement.” Accordingly, it would
seem that public health considerations can only be relevant to
the extent that they are consistent with TRIPS.
Interestingly, not every issue involving a conflict between
the interests of patent owners and patients prompts statements
reflecting the uber-right. For example, when Ecuador recently
announced that it would consider issuing compulsory licenses for
“priority medicines,” drug companies not only declined to
condemn Ecuador—unlike their response to Thailand—but
249
actually seemed to embrace Ecuador’s decision. In particular,
patent-owning drug companies are reported to have stated that
“[w]e accept the democratic decision . . . to use this extraordinary
legal measure . . . . No legal right of any kind can take
250
precedence over the interests of public health.” This strong
statement seems to reflect more of a privilege view of patents,
rather than an uber-right view. However, whether it reflects an
actual shift in position or simply a calculated public relations
251
move is an important, yet unanswered, question.
It is possible that patent-owning companies continue to
maintain an uber-right view, but have simply elected to take
actions that would promote this view, without specifically
telegraphing its existence, in order to avoid public criticism. In
particular, the uber-right perspective views TRIPS as providing
inadequate protection, such that stronger agreements that better
reflect the uber-right perspective are required. Free trade
agreements negotiated by powerful countries such as the United
States and the European countries often mandate such stronger
rights and are thus aptly referred to as “TRIPS-plus
agreements.” Given this scenario, there may be no need to
criticize potential compulsory licenses if the ability to grant them

249.
This is surprising because both countries are lower-middle-income countries and
the drugs Ecuador is considering licensing—second-generation HIV drugs and cancer
treatments—prompted great controversy when licensed by Thailand.
250.
Jeanneth Valdivieso, Ecuador to Make Cheap Versions of Patented Drugs,
BUSINESSWEEK,
Oct.
28,
2009,
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/
D9BKAV5G0.htm.
251.
Interestingly, this bold statement is reported in the press, but not on any of the
websites of companies that participated in this announcement.
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252

Even in
will be limited by such TRIPS-plus agreements.
TRIPS-plus agreements that do not specifically limit compulsory
licensing, other provisions may make compulsory licenses a moot
point because they limit the ability of a potential generic
manufacturer to obtain regulatory approval for the proposed
generic drug based on existing studies completed by the patent
253
owner.
In addition, the currently negotiated AntiCounterfeiting Trade Act, more commonly known as ACTA, could
similarly impede access to medication through yet a different
route—by deeming goods in transit to constitute patent
infringement, even if they do not infringe at the point of origin or
destination. In other words, ACTA could extend the current EU
Regulation to a broader scope of countries. The details are
difficult to confirm because the agreement has largely been
254
negotiated under a veil of secrecy. However, it is nonetheless
worth mentioning as additional evidence of a continued uberright perspective through actions, rather than public statements.
The differing perspectives also have relevance for
approaches to reforming and refining patent law on both
domestic and global levels. To the uber-right, patent rights
should be strong and have limited exceptions. However, to the
privilege perspective, more exceptions to patent rights seem
necessary. This may be reflected in recent national legislation to
255
broaden compulsory licenses, as well as proposals to limit the
252.
Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public
Health, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1469, 1499–1500 (2007).
253.
These provisions are referred to as “data exclusivity” and provide a different
method for drug companies to protect their drugs from competition beyond the patent
system. Although such provisions have been criticized for their public health
consequences, they nonetheless often appear in free trade agreements. Carlos M. Correa,
Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products Under Free Trade
Agreements, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO
MEDICINES 97, 100, 122–23 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006); Meir Perez Pugatch,
Intellectual Property, Data Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Access, in NEGOTIATING
HEALTH, supra, at 81, 84–91.
254.
ACTA Text Revealed to 42 Select Insiders, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Oct. 15, 2009,
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/10/15/acta-text-revealed-to-42-select-insiders.
255.
For example, France extended compulsory licensing to cover diagnostic patents
in 2004 in response to concerns about the high cost and restrictive licensing practices of
patent owner Myriad Technologies. LOVE, supra note 84, at 9–10; Esther van Zimmerman
& Gilles Requena, Ex-Officio Licensing in the Medical Sector: The French Model, in GENE
PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 123, 132–33 (Geertrui van Overwalle ed., 2007)
(highlighting this case’s central role in raising global awareness of “the potential
undesirable effects on research and clinical services of restrictive licensing practices in
the field of genetic diagnostics”). In addition, Belgium has adopted a new law to permit
compulsory licenses in the interest of public health. Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory
Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 247, 250 (2009). Although neither nation has yet utilized these provisions, their
existence nonetheless reflects a privilege view of patents. Id.
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256

Moreover, the privilege view likely
scope of patentability.
believes that patents are not solely responsible for innovation
and thus may endorse current movements to consider alternative
means of promoting innovation. Rather, they are likely to note
that patents are an incomplete solution because patents only
promote research into the most lucrative areas, but not the areas
that are in most need, predominantly those afflicting countries
257
with little ability to pay hefty profit margins. For example, the
current charge of the World Health Organization to find
alternative means to promote innovation, such as through prizes
and faster regulatory approval for priority conditions, would be
258
consistent with the privilege view of patents.
2.

Support from Social Science.

a. Perspectives as Schema. The perspectives presented here
may also be viewed as consistent with social science literature
that documents imperfect information processing. In particular,
such research suggests that people rely on prior schemas or
heuristics that are essentially unconscious biases in receiving and
259
understanding new information. A schema has been defined as a
“mental structure which contains general expectations and

256.
See, e.g., Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 106
(2007) (proposing to exclude genes from patentability).
257.
Examples of this phenomenon are that existing patent rights seem to encourage
firms to look for “block-buster” drugs that garner huge profits, as well as many “me-too”
drugs that treat the same condition. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE
DRUG COMPANIES 74–79 (2004) (proposing drug companies be made to show the FDA
their new products work better than existing treatments, as opposed to being merely
“effective”). Moreover, such proponents might also note that although patent rights have
been expanding in scope and strength, the pipeline of new drugs has actually been
decreasing. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SCIENCE, BUSINESS,
REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 34 (2006) (detailing the ways in which intellectual property
protections enable pharmaceutical companies to continue profiting off existing drugs by
making negligible changes to the drugs’ dosage or form, or developing new uses for them).
258.
Sixty-First World Health Assembly, Global Strategy and Plan of Action on
Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property ¶¶ 35–36, WHA61.21 (May 24, 2008),
available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf.
259.
See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1125 (2004); see
also SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 97–99 (2d ed. 1991)
(providing an introduction to the area of social cognition); ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL
COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 17–19 (1999) (“[W]e take part in shaping our own
reality; the concepts we impose on events determine the meaning we extract from them.”).
Both schemas and heuristics are mental rules of thumb that can create errors in
judgment. KUNDA, supra, at 56. Schemas are discussed more in the area of cognitive
science, whereas heuristics are discussed within the field of behavioral law and
economics. See id. at 36, 106–07.
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260

knowledge of the world.” Although schemas are recognized as
essential to enable individuals to cope with the large amounts of
information that is present in everyday life, they have also been
identified as a possible source of bias. Indeed, one example of a
261
schema is a stereotype. Moreover, while some may believe that
biases such as stereotypes are only for the uneducated, cognitive
biases and imperfect decisionmaking can occur regardless of
262
education or sociocultural background. Not surprisingly, the
lessons of social science have been applied to a variety of areas to
263
both break obvious deadlocks as well as reveal new phenomena.
Each perspective can thus be seen as a schema through
which individuals receive and understand information, such as
TRIPS. While much of legal analysis assumes that individuals
may be completely impartial, this is not consistent with social
science research. However, existing frameworks for analysis,
such as the framework for interpreting TRIPS, seem to assume
that there can be a single and consistent meaning. Even if an
individual could hypothetically do so, the existing research on the
existence and power of prior schemas—such as patent
perspectives—suggests that attempts to interpret TRIPS will be
done through the lens of the preexisting perspective. The
distorted TRIPS interpretations and non-issues documented here
seem entirely consistent with the lessons of schemas. Granted,
schemas have more often been discussed in connection with
264
fundamental beliefs or stereotypes. However, views of patents
seem to also fit within the same model in that there seem to be
fundamental beliefs that are so intractable that their adherents
go to great lengths to try to persuade others through the creation
of websites, full-page advertisements, campaigns to Congress,
and beyond.
260.
MARTHA AUGOUSTINOS & IAIN WALKER, SOCIAL COGNITION: AN INTEGRATED
INTRODUCTION 32 (1995).
261.
Chen & Hanson, supra note 259, at 1125–26.
262.
Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and
Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 589 (2002); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1997) (noting how
“people in most social categories” exhibit signs of “unrealistic optimism”).
263.
See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1494–95
(2005) (applying implicit bias theory from social cognition literature to show how the FCC
relaxation of ownership orders may exacerbate implicit racist biases); L. Song Richardson,
When Human Experimentation Is Criminal, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89, 94 (2009)
(suggesting that implicit biases may result in doctors being given more lenient criminal
treatment); Stern, supra note 262, at 590–91 (contending cognitive consistency theory as
applied to notice and comment rulemaking limits public participation in federal
rulemaking).
264.
See, e.g., FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 259, at 97–99; KUNDA, supra note 259, at
17.
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Another important issue with schemas or any prior opinion
is that they may be resistant to change. Sometimes referred to in
the area of psychology as the concept of cognitive consistency,
there is research to show that people will maintain preexisting
beliefs out of proportion with actual correctness, even when
subsequent evidence reveals that the initial information was
265
incorrect. The general theory is that people have an inherent
need to ignore, discredit, or rationalize inconsistent information
266
to avoid the discomfort of cognitive dissonance. Those who view
patents as an uber-right may thus ignore TRIPS provisions if
they do not comport with the view that patents should be uberrights and instead focus on innovation. Similarly, a view of
patents as privilege could persist in the face of competing evidence
that strong patent rights are relevant to support at least some
types of innovation. This is consistent with research that suggests
267
a tendency to minimize or trivialize inconsistencies.
b. Implications. Even with this brief introduction to social
science literature, it should become apparent that perspectives
are not easily modified. Accordingly, any proposed solution that
aims to find a middle ground between the two competing
perspectives may actually be doomed to fail as individuals with
differing perspectives each reject the middle ground. This may
initially suggest that perspectives have no bearing on future
solutions. However, that is not necessarily the case; it may
simply be that further investigation into the existence of
perspectives, as well as social cognition, is necessary. For
example, some have suggested that beliefs are a function of
culture and that a better understanding of the underlying
268
cultural worldviews may be helpful in addressing controversies.

265.
See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE 169 (1980); Craig A.
Anderson, Mark R. Lepper & Lee Ross, Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of
Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1037, 1041–42 (1980); Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A Disconfirmation
Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 18 (1996);
Helen C. Harton & Bibb Latané, Information- and Thought-Induced Polarization: The
Mediating Role of Involvement in Making Attitudes Extreme, 12 J. SOC. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 271, 289 (1997); Charles G. Lord, Less Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently
Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098–99, 2105–06 (1979);
Arthur G. Miller et al., The Attitude Polarization Phenomenon: Role of Response Measure,
Attitude Extremity, and Behavioral Consequences of Reported Attitude Change, 64 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 564 (1993).
266.
LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2–3 (1957).
267.
E.g., Linda Simon, Jeff Greenberg & Jack Brehm, Trivialization: The Forgotten
Mode of Dissonance Reduction, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247, 250 (1995).
268.
See, e.g., Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the
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Further exploration of these questions may be necessary now
that these perspectives have been highlighted.
VI. CONCLUSION
The principal aim of this Article was to uncover and
document the power of competing perspectives, using the Thai
compulsory licenses as an illustration. The implications,
however, of such perspectives are much broader. The divergent
views on the Thai licenses are symptomatic of many disputes
concerning the proper balance of patents and public health,
including, but not limited to, controversies under TRIPS.
The competing perspectives help to explain current
difficulties addressing disputes concerning the extent to which
TRIPS provides nations with flexibility to address public health
needs. In a pre-TRIPS world, a nation that believed patents on
drugs unduly limited access to medication could restrict
patentability or, alternatively, provide broad exceptions to patent
rights. However, in a post-TRIPS world, although national
discretion technically exists under TRIPS, the extent of that
269
discretion is widely disputed. The TRIPS provision permitting
compulsory licensing is one such example of where TRIPS clearly
permits national discretion, yet that discretion has been
challenged.
The competing perspectives are also relevant to the
currently unanswered question concerning the relevance of policy
in the face of clear law. In particular, patent owners as well as all
uber-right view holders repeatedly suggest that compulsory
licenses present a huge threat to innovation that must be
considered regardless of global rules. Those who view patents as
privilege predictably state that the present rules reflect
negotiated rules after a discussion of policy. Who is correct?
If global rules can be easily jettisoned based on one side’s
argument that the rule is not proper policy, what then is the
point of the rule of law? In addition, considering policy after rules
have already been enacted should be done in a uniform way. If
patent owners want to consider policy issues in discussing
Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate,
55 EMORY L.J. 569, 570–71 (2006) (“[T]he only meaningful gun control debate is one that
explicitly addresses whether and how the underlying cultural visions at stake should be
embodied in American law.”); John Gastil et al., Deliberation Across the Cultural Divide:
Assessing the Potential for Reconciling Conflicting Cultural Orientations to Reproductive
Technology, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1772, 1781 (2008).
269.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 7–8, 30 (granting countries discretion to
formulate, administer, and enforce intellectual property laws through the use of
permissive language subject to varying interpretations, especially “may” and “should”).
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whether compulsory licenses should be issued, nations should
also be able to reevaluate the policy of having a patent system to
begin with because there is no clear data that patents alone lead
to more prosperity. Patent owning companies are unlikely to
want to reevaluate whether nations should be permitted to
deviate from the TRIPS requirement to have some level of
minimum patent rights. So, why should they be permitted to
deviate from the TRIPS rules regarding exceptions to patent
rights? Moreover, if countries could at any time revisit previously
negotiated rules, wouldn’t that wreak havoc on the rule of law
and make all negotiations moot?
On the other hand, if every international accord—whether
an official treaty or new “solution”—simply papers over existing
(albeit non-negotiated) perspectives, continued conflicts seem
inevitable. If this is true, there is a broader lesson for all future
attempts to legislate in the international arena. In particular,
signing an international agreement does not necessarily indicate
consensus—at least not on critical perspectives. While this may
be an obvious point to some in the international arena, the
tension surrounding issues of patents and public health perhaps
depicts an important example for future attempts to modify
national laws through international negotiation.
In addition, while this Article exposed the existence of
perspectives, more work remains to be done to better understand
and mediate these perspectives. Social science research informs
us that even among academics, there may be implicit biases that
work against seeing these perspectives. Accordingly, further
examples, together with greater use of research from cognitive
science, may be necessary. After all, that very research tells us
that people may cling to beliefs in the face of contrary evidence.
This Article takes a first step towards challenging beliefs, but
further discussion and elaboration of some of the current
controversies discussed here may help bolster the case for the
existence of perspectives. However, additional research into the
existence and interplay of divergent perspectives may be central
to eventually addressing how to best mediate competing views of
patents that have tremendous implications for any attempt to
eventually provide a sustainable outcome that balances patents
and public health.

